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60 Chapter 4<br />

at least for cases engaging the norm of legality. 26 No doubt we all<br />

would say that for any given case there must be a single court of last<br />

resort. That is true by definition (what would it mean to say that there<br />

is more than one court of last resort for any given case?) — and a good<br />

thing, too, in the sight of all who share the commonsense view that<br />

every episode of litigation had best come to an end sometime. Saying<br />

so does not, however, answer the question, prompted by the South<br />

African story, of whether or why, one and the same court must serve<br />

as court of last resort in every single case that turns on a point of<br />

constitutional law. Why not share out the work? Why not have two or<br />

more tribunals (or sets of tribunals) authorised and available to act as<br />

court of last resort in constitutional cases? There would be some<br />

serious detriments in such an arrangement, to be sure, but might<br />

there also be some benefits?<br />

In South Africa, as things stand, the more-than-one tribunals of<br />

last resort in constitutional matters would be the Constitutional Court<br />

and the Supreme Court of Appeal. (The required tweak is simple: Just<br />

revoke the former court’s power of review of decisions of the latter<br />

in constitutional matters.) In the US, the multiple tribunals of last<br />

resort in matters of US constitutional law would presumably be the<br />

federal Supreme Court on the one hand and the set composed of the<br />

highest courts of the states on the other hand. As it happens, that’s<br />

not the way it works in the US. Americans have avoided that result by<br />

our choice to provide for US Supreme Court review of state supreme<br />

court decisions on points of federal constitutional law. But was that a<br />

necessary choice, an inevitable choice? Judge Learned Hand found it<br />

so in his famous Holmes Lectures, 27 and still I must say it appears just<br />

a shade less inevitable to me now than it once did — largely as a result<br />

of my study of South African case law. (That is not to say I would<br />

recommend any change in our practice to Americans just now.)<br />

A multiple-peaks possibility for South Africa was more-or-less<br />

placed on the table by the Supreme Court of Appeal deciding<br />

Container Logistics. It was rejected by the Constitutional Court in<br />

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, it would seem definitively (the only<br />

question now under live debate being official expansion to plenary of<br />

the last-resort jurisdiction possessed solely by the Constitutional<br />

Court). As matters now stand, the Constitutional Court is vested with<br />

power to review any and every decision on a point of South African<br />

law rendered by any other court in the system, the only pre-<br />

26 ‘Closely resembling’, I say, but not quite the same thing. The proposition of the<br />

Supreme Court of Appeal was that it might invalidate one or another government<br />

action on the ground of deviation from a common-law norm of legality which is<br />

not at the same time a norm of constitutional law and so (<strong>this</strong> was the clearly<br />

intended implication) does not give rise to a constitutional matter reviewable by<br />

the Constitutional Court.<br />

27 L Hand The Bill of rights: The Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures (1958).

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