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Stu Woolman 205
things one has reason to value is (1) significant in itself for the person’s
overall freedom, and (2) important in fostering the person’s opportunity
to have valuable outcomes. 33
However, Sen’s aims are not limited to fostering the agency of the
individual. Individual agents should be understood both as ends-inthemselves
and as the ‘basic building blocks’ of aggregate social
development. The ‘greater freedom’ of individuals not only ‘enhances
the ability of people to help themselves and ... to influence the
world,’ it is essential for the development of society as a whole. 34 For
Sen, the link between individual capabilities and development is part
of a virtuous circle. Enhancement of individual freedom — by both
political and material means — leads to greater social development,
which, in turn, further enhances the possibilities for individual
capabilities and the freedom to lead the kinds of lives we have reason
to value.
This virtuous circle would appear to be what the Constitutional
Court in Khosa has in mind when it ties the well-being of the worst off
to the well-being of the wealthy. The enhancement of individual
capabilities of the poorest members of our political community
enhances the development of South Africa as a whole. Or put slightly
differently, the greater the ‘agency’ of the least well-off members of
our society, the greater the ‘agency’ of ‘all’ the members of our
society. This gloss on Khosa emphasises not the subjective sense of
well-being that the well-off might experience by tying their wellbeing
to that of the poor. Rather it emphasises an increase in the
objective sense of well-being that flows from the enhancement of the
agency of each individual member of our society.
3.6 The creation of a realm of ends
We may be able to see, now, how dignity builds upon a simple
premise, the refusal to turn away from suffering, and yields,
ultimately, a realm of ends. The refusal to turn away marks the very
beginning of our moral awareness — the first time we come to
understand that others are not mere instruments for the realisation
of our desires, but beings who are ends in themselves. This moral
awakening leads, almost ineluctably, to two further insights: (a) that
others are entitled to the same degree of concern and respect that we
would demand for ourselves; and (b) that others are entitled to that
equal respect and equal concern because they, like us, are possessed
of faculties and talents that enable them to pursue ends which give
their lives meaning.
33
A Sen Development as freedom (1999) 18.
34 As above.