Pandemic Influenza Plan - Questar III

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Section 12: H5N1 in Non-Human Animals Captive waterfowl, exhibition gamefowl, and poultry flocks reared on backyard premises have been used previously as sentinels for active surveillance for avian diseases (e.g., West Nile virus, St. Louis encephalitis virus, and other diseases). Use of sentinel species is under consideration as part of the national surveillance plan and may be used in key areas such as Alaska where bird migratory pathways from Asia and the United States overlap. B. Surveillance in Wild (Free-Ranging) Birds Multiple free-ranging wild bird species in Asia and Europe have been shown to have clinical disease associated with naturally acquired HPAI H5N1 infection. The majority of these cases have reportedly occurred as isolated instances, involving small numbers of animals from a limited number of species, and primarily in areas with pre-existing widespread poultry infection. While exact numbers and species are not always known, species with confirmed H5N1 infection include grey herons, little egrets, tree sparrows, pigeons, peregrine falcons and unspecified crow and magpie species. In addition, there was a large die-off involving multiple waterfowl species at a lake in China during 2005. The species affected in this large outbreak included bar-headed geese, brown-headed gulls, great black-headed gulls, ruddy shelducks and great cormorants. While not apparently involved in any outbreak situations as of yet, Whooper swans and mallards seem to have been affected at multiple sites and in larger numbers than many other species. The possibility for bird mortality in other species is unknown at this time. Wild birds are collected nationally for many government-agency and university-sponsored research studies. Collection of samples specifically for AI surveillance may soon be enhanced due to the risk of introduction of H5N1 into this hemisphere. Attention is being focused on the West Coast and Alaska where, it is believed, migratory birds may carry the virus into the United States from Asia and Russia. With this increased attention, more cases of low pathogenicity AI in wild birds are being reported, including H5N1 recently in Canada (unrelated to the HPAI H5N1 strains in Asia and Europe). Additional information is available from the National Wildlife Health Center (including guidance for people handling wild birds) at http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/research/avian_influenza/avian_influenza.html. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s Wildlife Pathology Unit (WPU) is responsible for wild (free-ranging) bird disease surveillance. Wild birds die of many more likely causes than AI, and the WPU can assess those causes. With no HPAI H5N1 in the U.S., there is no systematic wild bird AI surveillance in NY at this time, although systems for targeted surveillance are under consideration. Surveillance of waterfowl through hunter check stations is under consideration at the national level for key early detection areas such as Alaska. This type of surveillance may be considered in NYS depending on availability of resources. Previously in 2005, some birds were submitted by the WPU to the USDA National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) for AI testing, and no HPAI was reported. In addition, the New York State Department of Health’s (NYSDOH) Wadsworth Center is conducting influenza research on wild birds in collaboration with the WPU and will be conducting AI testing on some samples submitted by the WPU as part of WNV, botulism, February 7, 2006 12-4
Section 12: H5N1 in Non-Human Animals or other avian morbidity/mortality surveillance. Some of the birds submitted to the WPU may also be sampled for AI monitoring at the NYSVDL at Cornell, upon determination by the WPU that the birds are at high risk for HPAI, using guidelines developed in cooperation with NYSDAM. The WNV guidelines provide detailed information for bird submission procedures and appropriate contacts. See 2005 West Nile Virus Update: Appendix D on the Health Information Network: https://commerce.health.state.ny.us/hpn/westnile/guidelines.html#bird C. Surveillance in Captive (Zoologic or Privately Owned) Birds Captive wild birds have been clinically affected by HPAI H5N1 AI in Europe and Asia, most notably in an outbreak at a zoo in Thailand during the 1990s. This is the only reported outbreak in captive wild birds to date. Affected species included raptors (Greyheaded fish eagle, Serpent eagle, Hawk eagle, Spotted wood owl, Brown fish owl, Spotbellied eagle owl, and Buffy fish owl), songbirds (Scaly-breasted munia and Black drongo) and Grey heron. HPAI H5N1 was also confirmed in a psittacine bird (Pionus parrot) and multiple southeast Asian mesias (finches) during quarantine in the United Kingdom. American Zoo and Aquarium Association (AZA) institutions conduct veterinary and pathologic assessment of all animal deaths on their premises, including submission of appropriate diagnostic samples for avian flu testing when indicated. Testing specifically for AI on these specimens in NY is conducted at the NYSVDL at Cornell University with legal authority for this surveillance vested in the NYSDAM. Information about AZA AI guidelines is available at http://www.aza.org/Newsroom/PR_AvianFlu/. D. Surveillance in Mammals To date, information about natural H5N1 infection in mammals is limited to feline species. There have been two outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 in felids housed in zoos in Thailand and a few cases in felids at a national park in Vietnam. In Thailand during December 2003, two tigers (Panthera tigris) and two leopards (Panthera pardus) showed clinical signs of a respiratory disease and died unexpectedly. Virus isolation and RT-PCR confirmed the presence of the H5N1 virus that was currently circulating among poultry flocks in the area. The animals had been fed fresh chicken carcasses from a local slaughterhouse. A second, larger outbreak occurred at the end of 2004 at the biggest tiger zoo in Thailand. A total of 147 tigers died or were euthanized due to H5N1. In this case, although the outbreak was initiated by feeding contaminated carcasses to the animals, it appears to have been maintained by horizontal transmission of the virus between the animals (specific transmission mechanism currently unknown). Occasionally, other mammals have tested positive for H5N1 in association with the outbreak in Asia. February 7, 2006 12-5
Page 1 and 2:
February206 Pandemic Plan NewYorkSt
Page 3 and 4:
Introduction Pandemic influenza occ
Page 5 and 6:
example, at this time, it is realis
Page 7 and 8:
Acronyms (cont.) IND IHANS IRB ISHS
Page 9 and 10:
Section 1: Command and Control I. O
Page 11 and 12:
Section 1: Command and Control pers
Page 13 and 14:
February 7, 2006 Appendix 1-A
Page 15 and 16:
Appendix 1-B The Public Health Law
Page 17 and 18:
Appendix 1-B communicable diseases
Page 19 and 20:
Appendix 1-C Management Office or t
Page 21 and 22:
Appendix 1-E Suspension of Public M
Page 23 and 24:
Appendix 1-G A Guide to New York St
Page 25 and 26:
Appendix 1-G health commissioner. P
Page 27 and 28:
Appendix 1-G 8. State Institutions
Page 29 and 30:
Appendix 1-G b. Governor May Invoke
Page 31 and 32:
Appendix 1-G may direct, pursuant t
Page 33 and 34:
Appendix 1-G c. Commissioner of Gen
Page 35 and 36:
Appendix 1-G Designation of emergen
Page 37 and 38:
Appendix 1-G physician’s assistan
Page 39 and 40:
Appendix 1-H Summary of Public Offi
Page 41 and 42:
Section 2: Surveillance and Laborat
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Appendix 2-A • Surveillance Crite
Page 65 and 66:
Appendix 2-A • In New York City,
Page 67 and 68:
NYSDOH Novel Influenza Case Report
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Appendix 2-C to health care provide
Page 75 and 76:
Virus Detection History NYS Lab Num
Page 77 and 78:
Section 3: Healthcare Planning and
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Section 4: Infection Control I. Ove
Page 127 and 128:
Section 4: Infection Control I. Ove
Page 129 and 130:
Section 4: Infection Control A. Bas
Page 131 and 132:
Section 4: Infection Control Drople
Page 133 and 134:
Section 4: Infection Control • Pe
Page 135 and 136:
Section 4: Infection Control o Noti
Page 137 and 138:
Section 4: Infection Control E. Coh
Page 139 and 140:
Section 4: Infection Control If wid
Page 141 and 142:
Section 4: Infection Control • En
Page 143 and 144:
Section 4: Infection Control should
Page 145 and 146:
Section 4: Infection Control Policy
Page 147 and 148:
Section 4: Infection Control o Staf
Page 149 and 150:
Section 4: Infection Control • De
Page 151 and 152:
Section 4: Infection Control • Pr
Page 153 and 154:
Section 4: Infection Control The ma
Page 155 and 156:
Section 4: Infection Control • Up
Page 157 and 158:
Section 4: Infection Control Health
Page 159 and 160:
Appendix 4-A Soiled linen and laund
Page 161 and 162:
Appendix 4-B Respiratory Hygiene/Co
Page 163 and 164:
Section 5: Clinical Guidelines I. O
Page 165 and 166:
Section 5: Clinical Guidelines incu
Page 167 and 168:
Section 5: Clinical Guidelines 1) N
Page 169 and 170:
Section 5: Clinical Guidelines infe
Page 171 and 172:
Section 5: Clinical Guidelines Alth
Page 173 and 174:
Section 5: Clinical Guidelines Infe
Page 175 and 176:
Section 5: Clinical Guidelines •
Page 177 and 178:
Appendix 5-B Clinical Evaluation of
Page 179 and 180:
Appendix 5-C Special Situations and
Page 181 and 182:
Appendix 5-D handling soiled laundr
Page 183 and 184:
DRAFT Appendix 5-E Footnotes to App
Page 185 and 186:
Appendix 5-F February 7, 2006 1
Page 187 and 188:
Appendix 5-F 7. Guidance on the eva
Page 189 and 190:
Appendix 5-H Source: U.S. Departmen
Page 191 and 192:
February 7, 2006 2 Appendix 5-I
Page 193 and 194:
Appendix 5-J Clinical Presentation
Page 195 and 196:
Appendix 5-J diabetes mellitus), re
Page 197 and 198:
Appendix 5-J resistant S. aureus (M
Page 199 and 200:
Appendix 5-K eight patients—all o
Page 201 and 202:
Appendix 5-L Guidelines for Managem
Page 203 and 204:
Appendix 5-L testing should be perf
Page 205 and 206:
Appendix 5-L February 7, 2006 5
Page 207 and 208:
Section 6: Vaccine Procurement, Dis
Page 209 and 210:
Page 211 and 212:
Page 213 and 214:
Page 215 and 216:
Page 217 and 218:
Page 219 and 220:
Appendix 6-A Vaccine Priority Group
Page 221 and 222:
Appendix 6-B Mass Clinic Planning O
Page 223 and 224:
Appendix 6-C Vaccine and Antiviral
Page 225 and 226:
Appendix 6-C 1. Request Phase The r
Page 227 and 228:
Appendix 6-C 3. Receipt and Sign-of
Page 229 and 230:
Appendix 6-C • Work with local he
Page 231 and 232:
Section 7: Antiviral Medication Pro
Page 233 and 234:
Page 235 and 236:
Page 237 and 238:
Page 239 and 240:
Page 241 and 242:
Page 243 and 244:
Page 245 and 246:
Page 247 and 248:
Page 249 and 250:
Appendix 7-A Characteristics of Ant
Page 251 and 252:
Appendix 7-B a The drug package ins
Page 253 and 254:
Appendix 7-C 7 HCWs in emergency de
Page 255 and 256:
Section 8: Travel-Related Disease C
Page 257 and 258:
Page 259 and 260:
Page 261 and 262:
Page 263 and 264:
Page 265 and 266:
Page 267 and 268:
Appendix 8-A Home or Community-Base
Page 269 and 270:
Appendix 8-B Contact Identification
Page 271 and 272:
Appendix 8-B • Determine the time
Page 273 and 274:
Appendix 8-C Administrative Data: S
Page 275 and 276:
Appendix 8-D CONTACT DAILY TEMPERAT
Page 277 and 278:
Appendix 8-F Definitions: Intervent
Page 279 and 280:
Appendix 8-F facility. No specific
Page 281 and 282:
Appendix 8-F • Resources Required
Page 283 and 284:
Appendix 8-G Business Pandemic Infl
Page 285 and 286:
Appendix 8-G 4. Allocate resources
Page 287 and 288:
Appendix 8-H CDC guidelines suggest
Page 289 and 290:
Appendix 8-H If I am not masked I
Page 291 and 292:
Appendix 8-H NYSDOH Model Influenza
Page 293 and 294:
Appendix 8-H I understand that if
Page 295 and 296:
Section 9: Communications I. Overvi
Page 297 and 298: Section 9: Communications and commu
Page 299 and 300: Section 9: Communications web pages
Page 301 and 302: Section 9: Communications Local Hea
Page 303 and 304: Section 9: Communications • A JIC
Page 305 and 306: Section 9: Communications backup to
Page 307 and 308: Section 9: Communications • In th
Page 309 and 310: Appendix 9-A Public Health Risk Com
Page 311 and 312: Appendix 9-C New York State Departm
Page 313 and 314: Appendix 9-C PRE-EVENT MESSAGE MAP:
Page 315 and 316: Appendix 9-C PROTECTIVE MESSAGE MAP
Page 317 and 318: Appendix 9-C TREATMENT MESSAGE MAP:
Page 319 and 320: Appendix 9-C BUSINESS CONTINUITY PR
Page 321 and 322: Section 10: Training and Education
Page 327 and 328: Appendix 10-A NYSDOH STAFF PRIVATE
Page 335 and 336: FACILITY- BASED RNs FACILITY- BASED
Page 341 and 342: Section 11: Workforce Support I. Ov
Page 343 and 344: Section 11: Workforce Support Pande
Page 345 and 346: Section 12: Highly Pathogenic H5N1
Page 347: Section 12: H5N1 in Non-Human Anima
Page 351 and 352: Section 12: H5N1 in Non-Human Anima
Page 353 and 354: Section 12: H5N1 in Non-Human Anima
Page 355 and 356: Section 13: Public Health Preparedn
Page 389 and 390: Appendix 13-A NYSDOH Roles Notified
Page 391 and 392: Appendix 13-B Notifications sent by
Page 393 and 394: Appendix 13-B HAN posting is used a
Page 395 and 396: Appendix 13-B notification system t
Page 397 and 398: Appendix 13-C Overview of the Healt
Page 399 and 400:
Appendix 13-C • Ongoing surveilla
Page 401 and 402:
Table 1. Summary of HERDS Use To da
Page 403 and 404:
Appendix 13-D Commerce Access and A
Page 405 and 406:
Appendix 13-D Table 3. Organization
show all

Pandemic Influenza Plan - Questar III

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?