05.06.2014 Views

Pandemic Influenza Plan - Questar III

Pandemic Influenza Plan - Questar III

Pandemic Influenza Plan - Questar III

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Section 2: Surveillance and Laboratory Testing<br />

• These specimens must NOT be inoculated into cell culture.<br />

• If the laboratory has the capability of performing molecular detection by RT-<br />

PCR, nucleic acid to be used in the assay may be extracted in a BSL-2<br />

facility using a Class II biological safety cabinet and appropriate personal<br />

protective equipment. It should be noted that for molecular analysis of<br />

potential influenza A/H5 (Asian lineage) strains, the CDC recommends that<br />

procedures should be performed using BSL-2 facilities and BSL-3 practices.<br />

• After consultation with the Regional Epidemiologist, the original specimen<br />

should be forwarded to the Wadsworth Center for analysis.<br />

• An occupational health plan should be in place such that laboratory workers<br />

are regularly monitored for symptoms of respiratory infection. Detailed<br />

information about occupational health protection from avian influenza<br />

viruses in the laboratory can be found at the following Wadsworth Center<br />

web site: http://www.wadsworth.org/events/sars/SARS_Protocol.pdf<br />

• Surge capacity<br />

Should an increased demand for diagnostic testing arise that requires additional<br />

laboratory staff, the Laboratory Chief of the Zoonotic Diseases and Clinical<br />

Virology Laboratory will work with the Wadsworth Center senior administration<br />

to bring in appropriately trained and vaccinated personnel.<br />

• Contacts for additional information<br />

Dr. Kirsten St. George 518-869-4520, kxs16@health.state.ny.us<br />

Dr. Amy Dean 518-862-4322, abd01@health.state.ny.us<br />

Mr. Ryan Bennett 518-869-4551, rtc03@health.state.ny.us<br />

V. Epidemiologic Surge Capacity<br />

During the inter-pandemic phase, epidemiologic investigation of any suspect and<br />

confirmed human novel influenza virus infections will be extensive to attempt to limit<br />

transmission. If a novel strain of influenza strain that is capable of person-to-person<br />

transmission is suspected in New York State, staff may need to be mobilized in a short<br />

time frame to conduct surveillance activities, outbreak investigations, contact tracing, and<br />

to implement control measures. As a supplement to local health department staff,<br />

NYSDOH Regional and Central Office staff, including but not limited to those in the<br />

Bureaus of Communicable Disease Control (BCDC), Sexually Transmitted Disease<br />

Control (BSTDC), Tuberculosis Control (BTBC), and AIDS Epidemiology (BHAE) may<br />

be utilized.<br />

Many local health department epidemiologists and case investigators are nurses and may<br />

also be needed to assist with vaccination and/or antiviral therapy delivery. Given that<br />

public health medical staff may also be engaged in vaccine/antiviral initiatives, other<br />

local and state public health staff as noted above, may need to be mobilized and receive<br />

just in time training to assist with case investigations, contact tracing, and ensuring<br />

control measures are being implemented.<br />

February 7, 2006 2-20

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!