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NOTES
refugees. Appian emphasises that Sextus’ economic strength was based on banditry
by land and sea (App. Civ. 5.25.100; cf. on his youth in Spain ibid. 5.143.596;
cf. also ibid. 4.83.349 and above p. 39), but also mentions that numerous young
men of good birth flocked to his side because he represented the right cause. The
consensus of Appian (Civ. 4.25.105; 5.143.597) and Dio (45.10.3) in reporting
that Sextus Pompey, himself proscribed by the triumvirs, not only took in the
proscribed but also rewarded people in Italy for hiding them (he is supposed to
have paid twice the amount that the triumvirs had placed on their heads), already
reflects some positive evaluation. App. Civ. 5.143.597 even stresses that Sextus
never went on the offensive against Octavian and Antony but only ever acted in his
own defence. Working from hindsight as they do, the sources are naturally influenced
by Sextus’ ultimate failure. That the political leaders of the day, Octavian
and Antony, sometimes collaborated with him, and when they did legalised his
position (before 43 Antony appointed him praefectus classis et orae maritimae [Vell.
2.73.19]; in 43 he was proscribed; in 40 he again made an agreement with Antony
[App. Civ. 5.50.218] which enabled him to put Octavian under so much pressure
that in 39 the latter was forced to acquiesce in the Pact of Misenum; in 37 he fell
out with both Octavian and Augustus; and so in 36 he was eliminated by Octavian)
led to the paradoxical but for us very telling situation that the former pirate was
officially commissioned to rid the seas of pirates (Plut. Ant. 32.2), only then again
to become a pirate himself. It is a moot question as to which pirates Sextus was
supposed to combat. In 67 bc, Pompey the Great had broken the pirate menace,
but Sextus had revived it and now, given that as a result of his legalisation by the
Pact of Misenum his ‘pirates’ had become a regular naval force, there could scarcely
have been any others left.
38 Strab. 14.5.10 p. 672.
39 For the political history of the period of transition see E.S. Gruen, The Hellenistic
World and the Coming of Rome, Berkeley 1984.
40 On Cilician piracy see the literature cited above, p. 60, n. 22 and now, above all,
Pohl, Piraterie, esp. 13ff.
41 W. Hoben, Untersuchungen zur Stellung kleinasiatischer Dynasten in den Machtkämpfen
der ausgehenden römischen Republik, Mainz diss., 1969.
42 Details in Pohl, Piraterie 259ff.
43 Strab. 14.5.7 p. 671. H. Gundel, s.v. Zeniketes, RE IX A, 1967, 2500–2.
O. Benndorf, ‘Historische Inschriften vom Stadtthor zu Xanthos’, in Festschrift Otto
Hirschfeld, Berlin 1903, (75–86) 83ff. H.A. Ormerod, ‘The Campaigns of Servilius
Isauricus against the Pirates’, JRS 12, 1922, (35–56) 40–2; idem, Piracy in the
Ancient World. An Essay in Mediterranean History, Liverpool 1924, repr. 1978, 216f.
E. Ziebarth, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland,
Hamburg 1929, 34f. J. Vogt, ‘Zur Struktur der antiken Sklavenkriege’, in idem,
Sklaverei und Humanität. Studien zur antiken Sklaverei und ihrer Erforschung 2 , Wiesbaden
1972, 53. R. Syme, Anatolica. Studies in Strabo, ed. A.R. Birley, Oxford 1995, 158;
185; 279.
44 On the location see Ormerod, ‘The Campaigns’ (n. 43), 41. Idem, Piracy (n. 43),
216. E. Olshausen, s.v. Olympos 12, KlP IV, 1979, 294. Syme, Anatolica (n. 43),
208 and map 3, pp. 206f.
45 Cf. below, pp. 106–9.
46 Athen. 215 B-C. H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen, Munich 1967, I 429f.;
II 723. Athenaeus gives no clue as to the date of the episode. Berve settles on the
period 83–69 bc, when Cilicia was under the influence of Tigranes of Armenia. In
this respect he cites Strabo’s report (14.5.10 p. 672), referred to above, in which it
is said that at this time the land had fallen into the hands of many tyrants and
short-lived robber bands. In Berve’s view, neither tyrannical control over a city nor
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