whom the child is surren<strong>de</strong>red after birth, who has paid for the whole operation and who willraise the child as her own).Another area which offers a new challenge and, without any doubt, needs a serious legal an<strong>de</strong>thical analysis is that of genetics. Our society will have, at one point or another, to face againtwo different categories of problems. General social and ethical ones, such as those touchingupon the legality of inter-species breeding and of genetic engineering applied to the humanperson. A burning issue will probably be how far, as a society, are we prepared to go withoutendorsing eugenic policies with all the pitfalls that they represent in terms of the biologicalevolution of the human race, potential discrimination, and the symbolic danger of thematerialization of the eternal dream of the {perfect human person}. Other will be of a morepractical nature. The law, for instance, already has to evaluate the admissibility in evi<strong>de</strong>nce, forboth civil and criminal trials, of genetic imprints and DNA expertise.My first point is, I think, ma<strong>de</strong>: The challenges rose by mo<strong>de</strong>rn medicine and biology, forsociety in our present social and economic context, are crucial, extraordinary and very complex.Faced with these challenges, people, and mostly the informed public, often ask: what doesthe law do? and often blame the legislator for its silence and failure to act. The public <strong>de</strong>mandfor legal action takes two different forms. The first and the more common one is usually arequest for some form of criminal law intervention. Part of the public wrongly believes that themain and most important role of the law, if not really the only one, is to prohibit and punish. Thecontrol of medicine and science is, thus, clearly seen in a punitive perspective and supported bycriminal law. The second form is a clear <strong>de</strong>mand for legislative, rather than court action:legislation or regulation, rather than case law. The public sometimes wrongly assumes that agiven piece of legislation will, by magic, make the problems it addresses disappear. We, lawyersand social science people, know that this assumption is both unrealistic and dangerous.Unrealistic, on the one hand, because, to be efficient in terms of social control, legislation mustbe carefully prepared and timed, and not imposed without public discussion to the social groupas a whole. Hastily-drafted legislation, passed because of a particular crisis situation or sud<strong>de</strong>nlegislation, passed because of a particular crisis situation or sud<strong>de</strong>n political pressures, usuallymake bad law. It is dangerous, on the other hand, because legislation in itself cannot solve problemsthat are of a social nature without a number of preliminary conditions. Legislation that isineffective or ineffectual brings law and the legal system, as a whole, into disrepute, because itcarries with it the image of inefficiency and a built-in risk of civil disobedience.Lawyers and jurists themselves are, however, far from unanimous in their answers to theproblem of what law should do when confronted with scientific and medical challenges. Thislack of consensus is un<strong>de</strong>rstandable because answers vary greatly. Some will, of course, arguethat most, if not all of the fundamental responses, even to the new problems, are already in thelaw. It is perfectly legitimate, for instance, to argue that most of the problems related to thelegality of active and passive euthanasia have always been addressed by a number of specificsections of the present Criminal Co<strong>de</strong>s concerning homici<strong>de</strong>, the duty to treat, and the duty not tointerrupt a procedure that could lead to <strong>de</strong>ath or serious bodily harm. This answer is,superficially and formally, perfectly true in strict, analytical terms. However, it will not reallysatisfy either the public or the health care professionals. Physicians and nurses will, of course, bethe first to point out that these various acts of legislations were drafted at a time when mo<strong>de</strong>rntechnologies did not exist and that they are at best ambiguous, if not completely obsolete; and,consequently, that the very minimal duty of the legislator today should be to update them and rephrasethem in a form and a language adapted to mo<strong>de</strong>rn realities. They will also argue that it is2
unfair, in view of the total absence of mo<strong>de</strong>rn authoritative judicial prece<strong>de</strong>nts, to force a doctoror a nurse to go through the or<strong>de</strong>al of a criminal trial, just to get a court opinion on the possibleinterpretation of these sections.On the contrary, others will strenuously argue that law should keep away from the regulationof science, and, instead, let things stand and society <strong>de</strong>velop progressively its own rules mostlythrough bioethics, without having recourse to legislation. It is clear to me that the basic assumptionthat law should not take a position on moral issues is clearly wrong. There are certainly(and we must all be aware of it) some merits to the i<strong>de</strong>a, that before legislating, society shouldtake time to observe how new mo<strong>de</strong>s of behavior integrate into the existing social fabric, and notnecessarily jump the gun with immediate action. This, however, in my opinion, raises perhaps aslightly different, although related issue: that of the timing of legislation. It does not, in myopinion, reflect as such on the role of law itself and cannot be seriously used as an argument tothe effect that law should stay away from moral or ethical judgment. In a <strong>de</strong>mocratic society, lawis, and always will be, a privileged form of expression of a general public moral and socialconsensus.What is interesting in those two types of reactions is that, most of the time, if not always, therole of law is viewed solely in terms of a binary logical process, which consists of fixing, asclearly as possible, what should be allowed and what should be prohibited. It is easy to fall intothe trap of assessing the role of law solely in terms of do’s and don’ts, or in terms of permissionand punishment. The role of law, of course, is not limited to that and its response to biologicaland scientific challenges cannot and, in<strong>de</strong>ed, must not be confined within the limits of criminallaw. Civil or private law, as well as administrative law, also have an important role to play.How far, then, should the law control and monitor medicine and biology? It is perhaps easierto attempt an answer by first exposing a certain number of myths related to both law andmedicine, which have, in the past, either created unreasonable expectations or consi<strong>de</strong>rably<strong>de</strong>formed the role of the law.Insofar, as law is concerned, the first myth, it appears to me, is the myth of its omnipotence.We have already addressed that problem earlier, in a more specific way, in relation to the role ofcriminal law and of legislative action as a form of social control. Law, I think we all realize, isbut one technique amongst many others, to resolve social conflicts. I do not think I need to dwellmuch more on that first point: law, as a whole, and legislation by itself, cannot solve allproblems; it never has and never will. It remains an important, but blunt and imperfect, instrumentof social control.A second myth concerns the respective roles of legislation and jurispru<strong>de</strong>nce in theregulation of the medical practice. We have also already discussed that problem, but in a generalway. Some will argue that very little, or even no legislation, is nee<strong>de</strong>d, and also that, because ofthe need for adaptation and great flexibility, courts are to be preferred as better tools of socialcontrol.Scientific and medical areas <strong>de</strong>serve, I believe, special consi<strong>de</strong>ration because they raiseconcerns at two different levels of analysis. Faced with the social effects of new medical discoveries,society first has to <strong>de</strong>termine and <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> on their legality. Courts, of course, could also, andwill eventually, if asked to do so, <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> this basic issue. It does not follow, however, in myopinion, that because courts could provi<strong>de</strong> an answer, they should necessarily be entrusted withthis task. It seems to me that, in such matters, it is up to legislature to take its responsibility forthe following reasons.3
- Page 1 and 2: REVISTA DE LA ACADEMIA PUERTORRIQUE
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364) que la corroboración se relac
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40razonable a la intimidad, no hay
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46Estados Unidos, adopta una posici
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EL DOLOR Y LA ANGUSTIA MENTALRamón
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dice que éste no distingue entre e
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implicaciones negativas. Se debe de
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LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS FRENTE AL ESTA
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Yugoslavia, Georgia, Azerbaiján, A
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METASTESIS DE LA «RAZÓN» Y EL «
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fue quizás el producto de esa mism
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embargo, la corroboración de la ne
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VICuando Hegel, en su Phänomenolog
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del entendimiento (Verstehen) en el
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por el poder, por las estructuras y
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lo único que indica esta trasgresi
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Legislativa enmendó la Ley 53 orig
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Incluso, únicamente ofreció su t
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Al llegar a la gobernación en 1965
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Presidente del Tribunal Supremo y a
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Lamentablemente, vivimos en una soc
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1. El que en todas las acciones rel
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coordinación interagencial, con pa