single, all-powerful judge”. 17 With such mo<strong>de</strong>ls so near at hand, it would be a mistake to assumethat the only alternative to retaining the Gui<strong>de</strong>lines is a return to the pre-Gui<strong>de</strong>lines system. 18Appellate review of discretionary sentencing allows us to have our cake and eat it too; itoffers us a way to preserve the humanity of the sentencing system while preventing potential“disparities” from eroding the basic principle that, all other things being equal, similar crimesshould entail similar punishment. This proposal would allow judges to exercise the judgment thatis their calling while forcing them to explain themselves to their peers, to the public, and toposterity. It would also restore the flexibility necessary in sentencing while avoiding the unintelligibleand the bizarre.Perhaps best of all, an appellate review process for fe<strong>de</strong>ral criminal sentencing would oncemore be comprehensible to the public and to parties before the court. Punishment serves endsbeyond the mere application of official injury to a convicted criminal: it has a powerful socialfunction as the concretization of our disapproval of a particular act. Whatever penal theory onewishes to apply, 19 the clarity of the connection between wrong and punishment is vital. We mustonce again establish a clear connection between the offense and the sanction in criminalsentencing.Sentencing that becomes incomprehensible to the convicted <strong>de</strong>fendant being punished,mysterious to his victim, and baffling to the public, has taken a dangerous step toward beingperceived as being no more than arbitrary force. The legitimacy of our system of justice <strong>de</strong>mandsthat its workings be un<strong>de</strong>rstood by those upon whom it works. 20 Who, it might be asked, canreally be said to have had this proverbial “day in court” if the court’s sentencing <strong>de</strong>cision is17Charles Maechling, Jr., Truth in Prosecuting, 77 ABA. J.58 (1991). Cf. Steve Y. Koh, Note, Reestablishing the Fe<strong>de</strong>ralJudge’s Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L. J. 1109 (1992) (proposing that sentencing be conducted by “panels”of judges).18 Significantly, somewhere along the way, the Gui<strong>de</strong>lines system seems to have forgotten its basic purpose of doing justice.Fe<strong>de</strong>ral sentencing jurispru<strong>de</strong>nce today is almost exclusively concerned with issues such as whether or not the SentencingCommission can be said a<strong>de</strong>quately to have consi<strong>de</strong>red a particular mitigating or exacerbating factor so as to preclu<strong>de</strong> trial court<strong>de</strong>parture on that grounds. This has led courts increasingly, for example, away from “fundamental questions relating to the tra<strong>de</strong>offsamong sentencing purposes or alternatives to traditional imprisonment.” Stith and Koh, supra note 8, at 284.19Francis Allen, for example, has <strong>de</strong>scribed the United States as being caught between the phonological i<strong>de</strong>als of rehabilitationand retribution. In his account, American society in the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate era has lost its former confi<strong>de</strong>nce inthe malleability of human character and can no longer reach a consensus about what it means for a criminal to be rehabilitatedand about the general purposes of criminal punishment. As a result, he feels the rehabilitative i<strong>de</strong>al, which flourished in NorthAmerica from the early nineteenth century, has lost ground to a more purely retributive ethic that prefers, for example, mandatoryprison terms to the possibility of early parole and strict sentencing rules to the application of judicial discretion. See, e.q, FrancisAllen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative I<strong>de</strong>al 5-12, 28-31 (1981). Much of this shift can be seen in the history of the 1984sentencing reforms. Whatever one’s position on the merits of the rehabilitative or retributive paradigms, however, the social purposesof each <strong>de</strong>mand some comprehensible connection between the wrong done and the injury society accordingly inflicts uponthe wrongdoer. Even a sternly retributive system, after all, only punishes proportionately, and may only do so for a clear reason.Our current process presents no intelligible penal philosophy to anyone outsi<strong>de</strong> the rarified air of the fe<strong>de</strong>ral bench, if even there.20 In Foucault’s account, mo<strong>de</strong>rn justice requires such a connection. In former centuries, the public administration of gruesomecorporal punishment involved a ritualized application of physical fear and collective horror, to affirm the power and gran<strong>de</strong>ur ofthe sovereign against affront. Now, however, the relevant mo<strong>de</strong>l of punishment is “based on the lesson, the discourse, the<strong>de</strong>cipherable sign, the representation of public morality... the collective reinforcements of the link between the i<strong>de</strong>a of crime andthe i<strong>de</strong>a of punishment.” Today, “the punishments must be a school rather than a festival, an ever-open book rather than aceremony.... A secret punishment is a punishment half wasted.” Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish 110-11 (AlanSheridan, trans., 1979). It is a vital social function of punishment, therefore, to make of the offen<strong>de</strong>r a living lesson in the museumof or<strong>de</strong>r. Id. at 112. While the administration of the penalty should itself be carried out in secret, this philosophy insists,“the sentence and the reasons for it should be known to all.” Id at 124. In the name of rational reform, however, we have todaytraduced this mo<strong>de</strong>rn penal principle by adopting a sentencing process as incomprehensible to parties and to the public as ifcarried out in a foreign tongue.
nothing more than a mechanistic computation to all but the most expert. 21 If in 1993 we nolonger trust central planners with our pocketbooks or our political liberties, what business havewe ceding to them administration of our criminal justice system?Justice may sometimes require more leniency than the Gui<strong>de</strong>lines permit. It may sometimesrequire more severity. Justice, if submit, will always, however, require more nuance andflexibility than can be provi<strong>de</strong>d by a set of “gui<strong>de</strong>lines” fashioned by a bureaucracy.21 This was recognized by the prison and sentencing reformers of twenty years ago, though this basic insight seems since to havebeen forgotten. As Norval Morris wrote, “until sentencing can become principled, until a jurispru<strong>de</strong>nce of sentencing supportedby an ample common law and the articulation of criteria of punishment can be phrased and applied, the task of the penalreformer will remain intractable.” Normal Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 50 (1974). By these standards, the SentencingGui<strong>de</strong>lines are a scant improvement over the previous system. The simple provision of appellate review for discretionarysentencing <strong>de</strong>cisions, however, would meet Morris’ criteria and a body of common law sentencing prece<strong>de</strong>nt would <strong>de</strong>velopmuch as it does with respect to other areas of the law.
- Page 1 and 2: REVISTA DE LA ACADEMIA PUERTORRIQUE
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LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS FRENTE AL ESTA
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Yugoslavia, Georgia, Azerbaiján, A
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METASTESIS DE LA «RAZÓN» Y EL «
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fue quizás el producto de esa mism
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embargo, la corroboración de la ne
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VICuando Hegel, en su Phänomenolog
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del entendimiento (Verstehen) en el
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por el poder, por las estructuras y
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Legislativa enmendó la Ley 53 orig
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Al llegar a la gobernación en 1965
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Presidente del Tribunal Supremo y a
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Lamentablemente, vivimos en una soc
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coordinación interagencial, con pa