Odger's English Common Law

PRESUMPTION MAY BE REBUTTED. 117
or delaying his creditors, he must be taken to have made the deed with
that intent." J
There are some cases, however, in which the terms of a statute expressly
make a particular act criminal, and throw upon the accused the onus of
proving that his intent was innocent. Thus, it is a misdemeanour for a
bankrupt not to deliver up all his property to his trustee, " unless the jury
is satisfied that he had no intent to defraud ; " and the burden of so satisfy-
ing the jury rests upon the bankrupt."
A chemist by mistake mixes a poisonous drug in the medicine which he
is preparing for a sick child. The child's mother administers to it that
medicine, believing it will do the child good. She intends to administer
that medicine ;
but she does not intend to poison her child, although that in
this case is the natural and necessary consequence of her act.
A man climbs up into a railway signal box and pulls a lever. The
natural and necessary consequence of such an act at such a time is that
an express train is diverted into a siding and comes violently into collision
with a goods train, the guard, of which is killed. The man was not aware
that this would be the result of his act, so it cannot be said that he
intended to cause the collision ;
yet he is guilty of manslaughter.
On the other hand, there are cases iu which the words
of a statute are so strong as to render criminal any act in
contravention of it, though done without any guilty know-
ledge and without any criminal intent. "We have
had quoted the maxim that in every criminal offence there
must be a guilty mind ; but I do not think that maxim has
so wide an application as it is sometimes considered to have.
In old time, and as applicable to the common law or to earlier
statutes, the maxim may have been of general application
but a difference has arisen owing to the greater precision of
modern statutes," which renders it " necessary to look at the
object of each Act that is under consideration to see whether
and how far mens rea is of the essence of the offence created." 3
If, then, the words of a modern statute amount to an absolute
prohibition of a certain act without any reference to the state
of mind of the actor, mens rea is not an essential ingredient
in the offence; and in such a case any inquiry as to the
intent which actuated the accused would be immaterial
—except perhaps with a view to mitigation of punishment.
1 Per cur. in Graham v. Chapman (1852), 12 C. B. at p. 103.
2 The Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 11 ; B. v. Thomas (1869), 11
Cox, 535 ; R. v. Bolus (1870), 23 L. T. 339.
» Per Stephen, J., in Cundy v. Le Cocq (1884), 13 Q. B. D. at p. 210.
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