Odger's English Common Law

122 THE ELEMENTS OF A CRIME.
that he broke and entered the dwelling-house with intent to commit a
felony therein. If he entered only to gain shelter for the night or to study
the owner's books without his permission, he is not guilty of felony.
A railway passenger who travels in a superior class to that for which his
ticket was issued, or who uses a ticket on any day for which it is not
available, cannot be convicted of a criminal offence unless it be proved
that he did so with intent to defraud, and this although the by-law under
which he is prosecuted is silent as to the necessity of any such intent. 1
There are cases, however, in which " the thing speaks for itself."
Thus a prisoner was convicted under a repealed statute for setting fire to a
mill with intent to injure the occupier. No evidence was given at the trial
from which an intent to injure any one might be inferred other than the
mere act of setting fire to the mill. Nevertheless, the Court for Crown
Cases Eeserved confirmed the conviction, because " a party who does an
act wilfully necessarily intends that which must be the consequence of the
act." 2
Again, in many cases it is not enough for the prosecution
to prove that the prisoner did the act complained of and that
he did it unlawfully or with an improper intention ;
evidence
must be given in addition to establish that, at the time when
the prisoner did the act, he knew certain material facts which
rendered his conduct more heinous. 3
This is especially the
case whenever the prisoner is charged with any kind of fraud,
for the burden of proving fraud always lies heavily upon him
who alleges it.
When a man is charged with obtaining goods by false pretences, the
prosecution must show not merely that what the accused said was false, but
also that it was false to his knowledge. So no one can be convicted of
uttering a forged document or of passing bad coin without proof that he
knew the document to be forged or the coin to be bad. Again, on an
indictment for receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen,
the burden of proving affirmatively that the prisoner knew the goods to
have been stolen lies on the prosecution. 4 On the other hand, it is not
necessary, in order to support a charge of bigamy, for the prosecution to
prove that at the time of the second ceremony the prisoner knew that his.
wife was still alive.
1 Dyson v. L. % N. W. By. Co. (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 32 ; Buffam v. North
Staffordshire By. Co., [1894] 2 Q. B. 821. .
2 B. v. Harrington (1811), E. & R. 207 ; and see B. v. Houghton (1833), 5
C.&P. 559 ; R. v. Horsey (1862), 3 F. & F. 287 ; B. v. Child (1871), L;. R. 1
0. C. R. 307 ; B. v. Seme (1887), 16 Cox, 311.
8 See Core v. James (1871), L. R. 7 Q. B. 135 ; R. v. Harvey (1871), L. R. 1
C. C. E. 284. Contrast the decisions in M. v. Forbes and Webb (1865), 10 Cox,
362, and Cundy v. Le Coeq (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 207, with that in Sherrasv. De
Butzen, [1895] 1 Q. B. 918 ; ante, pp. 118, 119.
' But see the Larency Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 50), s. 43 (1), post, p. 384.