Odger's English Common Law

574 DISTURBANCE OF EASEMENTS, &C.
So a tenant for a term of years cannot acquire by user an
easement, such as a right of way over land occupied by
another tenant under the same landlord, even if that user
has existed for the period of forty years mentioned in section 2
of the Prescription Act. 1
Again, it is open to the defendant to prove the existence
of an obstruction at the commencement of the period of
twenty years or an interruption of the enjoyment (as defined
by the statute) at some time during that period. 2
Section 4
of the Act provides that " each of the respective periods of
years stall be deemed and taken to be the period next before
some suit or action wherein the claim or matter to which
such period may relate shall have been or shall be brought in
question ;
" and " no act or other matter shall be deemed an
interruption within the meaning of this statute unless the
same shall have been or shall be submitted to or acquiesced
in for one year after the party interrupted shall have had or
shall have notice thereof, and of the person making or autho-
rising the same to be made." It would seem that the person }
who asserts that an alleged twenty years' enjoyment of light
has been interrupted during that period, is bound to prove
that some notice ( other than that which arises from the mere
existence of a physical obstruction) was given to the person
claiming the right by the person by whose authority the
interruption was made. 8
Where the plaintiff claims a right of way or a right to any
watercourse or use of water, if the servient tenement be held
for any term of life or for any term of years exceeding three,
the time of enjoyment during the continuance of that term
is excluded in computing the period of forty years in case
the claim, should be resisted within three years next after the
end or sooner determination of such term by any person
entitled to any reversion expectant on its determination. 4
i Kilgour v. Gaddes, [1904] 1 K. B. 457.
2 Glover v. Chapman\lS7i), L. B. 10 C. P. 108 ; Mitchell v. CamtriU (1887), 37
Ch. D. 56.
3 Seddon v. Bank of Bolton (1882), 19 Ch. D. 462.
* S. 8 ; and see Palk v. Skinner (1852), 18 Q. B. 5B8,!which shows that s. 9 only
applies to the period of forty years. A remainderman is not such a person, : Symont
v. Leaker (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 629.