Odger's English Common Law

482 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON.
to constables who have acted under magisterial warrants
issued without jurisdiction, and in some other cases. 1
(d) A justice of the peace has a twofold power in relation
to the arrest of felons. If he sees a felony or any breach of
the peace being committed, he may, like any private individual,
himself apprehend the felon ;
or he may command some one
else to do so, and such a command is a good warrant without
writing. But if the felony or other breach of the peace be
committed in his absence, then he must issue his warrant in
— ;
writing under his seal to apprehend the offender*
•Where upon the complaint of another a justice of the
peace acts judicially, using the discretionary power given him
by statute, he will not be liable for a mere error of judgment
2
and he is protected from liability in respect of " any act "
within his jurisdiction— " done by him in the execution of
his duty as such justice," except where he is proved to have
acted " maliciously and without reasonable and probable
cause." 3
Again, where the justice has acted in a matter within his
jurisdiction, a conviction good upon the face of it will be
a sufficient protection to him ; for such conviction, so long as it
remains in force, is conclusive evidence of the facts stated
in it, and cannot be impugned or rebutted even by proof
of corrupt motives or of malice. 4 " It is a general rule
and principle of law that, where justices of the peace have
an authority given to them by an Act of Parliament, and they
appear to have acted within the jurisdiction so given and to
have done all that they are required by the Act to do in order
to originate their jurisdiction, a conviction drawn up in due
form and remaining in force is a protection in any action
brought against them for the act so done." 6
But " for any act done by a justice of the peace in a matter
1 24 Geo. II. c. 44, ss. 6 and 8.
2 11 & 12 Vict. o. 44, s. 4 ; and see Linford v. Fitzroy (1849), 13 Q. B. 240.
3 lb. s. 1 ; andsee Bott v. Achroyd (1869), 28 L. J. k. C. 207 ; Sommerville v.
Mirehouse (1860), 1 B. & S. 652. A justice of the peace is not liable for words
spoken by him on the bench, during the hearing of a case over which he had
jurisdiction, even though it be alleged that the words were spoken falsely and
maliciously and without reasonable cause : Law
v. Llewellyn, [1906] 1 K. B. 487.
4 Brittaim. v. Kinnaird (1819), 1 B. & B. 432.
6 Per Abbott, C. J., in Basten v. Carew (1825), 3 B. & C. at pp. 652, 653.