Odger's English Common Law

148 TREASON.
ammunition, or any other act of mere preparation, for the killing or
deposing of the King is clearly an overt act of treason which is proof of
imagining his death. And " to conspire to imprison the King by force, and
move towards it by assembling company," is an overt act of compassing
the King's death. In the case of Lord Preston, collecting information
for the use of the French King in a design against this country was held
to be an overt act of treason, although the information so collected never
reached the French. 1 In the case of R. v. Lynch, 2 the acts of applying
for letters of naturalization, taking the oath of allegiance, and making the
declaration of -willingness to take up arms for the South African Eepublic
were all held to be overt acts of treason.
Words merely spoken cannot amount to treason, though
they may to sedition. "Unless it be by some particular
statute, no words will be treason ;
"
3 and there is no such
statute. Expressions of disloyalty, not specifically connected
with any treasonable act or design, do not constitute an overt
act of treason. But words which directly incite another to
commit treason, or which amount to a treasonable con-
spiracy, 4 will be sufficient for this purpose ; and words
which accompany an act alleged to be treasonable are
admissible in evidence to show the true nature of that act.
Writing treasonable words is, no doubt, a more deliberate
act than merely uttering them. But even in this case the
bare words are not treason ; and if the writings be not
published, they do not constitute an overt act of treason.
The conscious publication of printed or written treason is,
however, a sufficient overt act. Under the 36 Geo. III. c. 7, it
is sufficient if the traitorous compassings be declared "by pub-
lishing any printing or writing, or by any overt act or deed."
Where C, being beyond sea, said, " I will kill the King of England if I
can come at him," and the indictment, after setting forth the above words,
charged that C. came into England for the purpose of killing the King, it
was held that C. might on proof of the above facts rightly be convicted
of treason ; for the traitorous intention evinced by his words converted an
action innocent in itself into an overt act of treason. 6
1 lord Preston's Case (1691). 12 How. St. Tr. 646. 727.
2 [1903] 1 K. B. 444.
s Hugh Pine's Case (1628), Cro. Cax. at p. 126.
* Muloahy v. S. (1868), L. E. 3 H. L. 306.
5 The contrary was no doubt decided in M. v. Peacham (1615), Foster's Crown
Cases, 199, and Cro. Car. 125, and R. v. Algernon Sidney (1683), 9 St. Tr. 889, 893,
but the latter case was reversed by a private Act of Parliament in 1689, though not
expressly on this point. See Stephen, "History of the Criminal Law," ii! 246 247
8 Foster's Crown Caees, pp. 200, 202.