Odger's English Common Law

426 TORTS GENERALLY.
As soon as the plaintiff has established a prima facie case,
it will be for the defendant to justify his act. Thi3 he can
do in some cases by showing a special right or duty in him-
self, which in the circumstances of the case limits the
plaintiff's right or excuses the defendant's conduct. Here
again difficult questions of law sometimes arise.
Thus, in Semayne's Case, 1 it was argued that the sheriffs of the City of
London were entitled, when executing the process of the Court, to break open
the outer door of the dwelling-house of a judgment debtor in violation of
the well-known maxim of our law that " Every man's house is his castle.''
The Court, however, held that a sheriff was not entitled so to break open
an outer door if the action were brought and process issued at the suit of a
private person ; but that, if the process issued at the suit of the Crown, he
would have the right to do so, though " before he breaks it he ought to
signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open the doors."
But the sheriff, when executing process even at the suit of a private
individual, may, after entry has been demanded and refused, break open the
inner door of a dwelling-house or the outer door of any building which is not
a dwelling-house and is in the occupation of the judgment debtor. 2
II.
Secondly, an action of tort may be founded on the breach
of some private duty owed to the plaintiff which causes him
damage.
By " private duty " here is meant any obligation which
the particular plaintiff, and not the community at large, has
a right to enforce. The class of private duties is therefore
very large, arising, as they do, from the infinite number of
relationships in which one person may stand to another.
It is no good ground of objection to an action that injury of such a kind
has never previously been made the subject of legal proceedings ; it is.
sufficient if it comes within any principle upon which the Courts act. As
Pratt, C. J., observed, 3 " it is said this action was never brought before ;
I wish never to hear this objection again. This action is for a tort ; torts-
are infinitely various, not limited or confined, for there is nothing in nature
but may be an instrument of mischief." But if it be sought to make an
(1851). 8 Cush. (TJ. S.) R. 595 ; Wotkerspoon v. Currie (1872), L. R. 5 H. L.
508 ; Thompson v. Montgomery, [1891] A. C. 217 ; Reddaway v. Banham, [1896}
A. C. 199 ; London General Omnibus Co. v. Lavell, [1901] 1 Ch. 135 ; Bourne v.
Swan & Edgar, Ltd., [1903] I Ch. 211.
1 (1604), 5 Rep. 91 ; 1 Smith, L. C, 12th ed., 115.
2 Eodder v. Williams, [1895] 2 Q. B. 663.
8 Chapman v. Pickersgill (1762), 2 Wils. at p. 14G.