Odger's English Common Law

WORDS CAUSING DAMAGE. 541
title survives to his executors to the extent that any damage
can be shown to the estate of the deceased. 1
It is quite possible, however, that the same words may give
rise to an action of both kinds. An attack upon a thing may
also be an indirect attack upon the owner of that thing or
some other individual who is immediately connected with
it. Thus to impute that the goods which the plaintiff sells or
manufactures are to his knowledge worthless or adulterated
is a distinct charge against the plaintiff of fraud and dis-
honesty in his trade. 2
In a proper case the plaintiff may not
only recover damages, but also obtain an injunction. It is
seldom, however, that an interim injunction is granted.
There has been considerable doubt as to the precise degree of malice
necessary to sustain an action for words causing damage ; but the law on
the point seems now to be fairly well settled. It is not necessary for the
plaintiff to prove (unless the occasion be privileged, when he must of
course show express malice) that the defendant desired and intended to
inflict loss on the plaintiff, or that he was recklessly indifferent whether
loss would .follow or not. In Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes
Chemical Manure Co. 3 the Court held that it was sufficient if the words
were published " without lawful occasion." And now anything will be
evidence of malice which may reasonably lead the jury to infer that the
words were published without "justification" or without "just cause or
excuse." 4 " The jury may infer malice from the absence of probable cause,
but they are not bound to do so. The want of probable cause does not
necessarily lead to an inference of malice, neither does the existence of
probable cause afford any answer to the action." 5
The mere fact that the plaintiff and the defendant are rivals in the same
line of business is by itself no evidence of malice ; indeed, it rather tends
to negative malice, as it renders it probable that the words were published
with the object of promoting the defendant's own trade and not of injuring
the plaintiff. 6 " It was not malice if the object of the writer was to push
his own business, though at the same time it might incidentally injure
another person's business. . . . The mere fact that it would injure another
person's business was no evidence of malice." '
1 Hatchard v. Mige (1887), 18 Q. B. D. 771.
2 lb. ; Linotype Co., Ltd. v. British Umpire $c, Co. (1899), 81 L. T. 331 ; 15 Times-
L. R. 524.
8 (1874), L. B. 9 Ex. 218.
4 Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A. C. 495 ; Giblan v. National Amalgamated, $c,
[1903] 2 K. B. 600 ; South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan, Coal Co.,
[1905] A. C. 239.
« Per Maule, J., in Pater v. Baker (1847), 3 C. B. at p. 868.
6 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, [1892] A. C. 25 ; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1.
7 Per Collins, M. R., in Dunfap Pneii matie Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Maiso/i Talbot and others
(1904), 20 Times L. R. at p. 581. And see White v. MelHn, [1895] A. C. at p. 164.