Odger's English Common Law

INTENTION NOT ALWAYS ESSENTIAL. 119
food sold by them as containing 58 per cent, of oil albumenoids, whereas
it in fact contained only 51 per cent. Their analyst had certified to them
that it contained over 60 per cent., and they honestly believed this to be
the correct percentage when they sold it. The justices dismissed the.
summons on the ground that there was no evidence of guilty knowledge
on the part of the defendants. But on a case being stated the Divisional
Court "held that guilty knowledge was not a constituent element of the
offence created by the Act, and that the defendants ought to be convicted. 1
But the law is not always quite so strict. By section 16, sub-s. 2, of the
Licensing Act, 1872, 2 "if any licensed person supplies any liquor or
refreshment ... to any constable on duty, he shall be liable to a
penalty. . . ." In Sherras v. Be Rutzen, 3 the accused did supply liquor to
a constable on duty ; but he bond fide believed that the constable was off
duty, and the latter had in fact removed his armlet before entering the
public-house. The accused was convicted, and his conviction was
upheld on appeal to Quarter Sessions ; but this Court consented to state a
case for the opinion of the Divisional Court, and the conviction was
quashed. Day, J., expressed the opinion " that it would be straining the
law to say that this publican, acting as he did in the bond fide belief
that the constable was off duty, and having reasonable grounds for that
belief, was nevertheless guilty of an offence against the section, for which
he was liable both to a penalty and to have his licence indorsed."
Again, where intoxicating liquor was knowingly sold to a child under
fourteen in a bottle neither corked nor sealed, as is required by section 2 of
the Intoxicating Liquors (Sale to Children) Act, 1901, by a servant of a
licensed person contrary to the express orders and without the knowledge
of his master, it was held that the master, who at the time of the sale was
himself in another part of the bar, which was crowded, could not be con-
victed of " knowingly allowing " such sale. 4
So where the appellant was charged under section 27 of the Sale of Food
and Drugs Act, 1875, 5 with giving a false warranty in writing to a pur-
chaser in respect of an article of food sold by him, which warranty he did
not know and had no reason to believe to be false, it was held that lie was
not liable to be convicted. 6 " Where it is sought to be shown that the
Legislature means to punish without requiring proof of moral guilt, such
an intention must be very clearly expressed." 7
(2) Criminal Negligence.
A guilty mind is, as we have seen, in general essential to
the legal conception of a crime. It may exist not only where
1 Laird v, Dobell, [1906] 1 K. B. 131 ; and see the Destructive Insects and
Pests Order, June 18th, 1908, made under the Acts of 1877 and 1907 (40 & 41 Victo,
c. 68 ; 7 Edw. VII. c. 4), in Statutory Rules and Orders, 1908, p. 306.
a 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94.
8 [1895] 1 Q. B. 918, 921.
* Emary v. MtUoth, [1903] 2 K. B. 264.
s 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63.
6 Derbyshire v. Bouliston, [1897] 1 Q. B. 772.
i Per Hawkins, J„ ib. at p. 776.