Odger's English Common Law

428 TORTS GENERALLY.
were damnified owing to such certificates being negligently drawn up ; for
they had not appointed the surveyor and consequently he owed no duty to
them. 1
So, too, an occupier of land is under no duty towards his neighbour to
periodically cut the thistles naturally growing on his laud, and if, owing to
his neglect to cut them, thistle seeds are blown on to his neighbour's land
and there do damage, he is not liable. 2
Where the defendant placed a horse in a field through which he knew
persons were in the habit of taking a " short cut" to the railway station, he
was held liable for injuries caused to one of such trespassers who was bitten
by the horse, as the county court judge found that the plaintiff was in the
field without express leave, but with the permission of the defendant. 3
So where a railway company kept a turntable unlocked (and therefore
dangerous to children) on their land close to a public road, and a child of
four years of age was injured while playing with it, it was held by the
House of Lords that there was evidence to go to a jury of actionable negli-
gence on the part of the railway company, although the child was a
trespasser, because the company's servants well knew that children were in
the habit of trespassing and playing with the turntable. 4 But where there
is neither " allurement, nor trap, nor invitation, nor dangerous object placed
upon the land," the defendant will not be liable. 6
In order, then, to sustain an action of this kind, the
plaintiff must first establish the existence of a specific duty
owed to himself, with breach of which the defendant is
charged. He must, therefore, be able to prove facts from which
such specific duty will in law arise. Then he must also show
a breach of such duty. Lastly, he must prove some conse-
quential damage to himself. There must be both an injury
inflicted and loss resulting from that injury. The injury must
be the act of the defendant, and the loss must be a direct
and natural, not a remote and indirect, consequence of that
act. 6
Unless loss directly results from the act, the mere
intention or even an attempt to produce it will not be a cause
of action. An act which does not amount to a legal injury
cannot become actionable because it is done with a bad intent
thus no action lies against a man for maliciously doing his
duty. And although the existence of malice is sometimes
essential to the cause of action, it is no cause of action in
1 Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q. B. 491.
2
Giles v. Walker (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 656.
8 Lowery v. Walker, [1911] A. C. 10.
4 Cooke v. Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland, [1909] A. C. 229.
" Latham v. R. Johnson, Nephew, Ltd.,
fy [1913] 1 K. B. 398.
6 See post, pp. 1282 et srq.
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