Odger's English Common Law

276 MURDER.
If A. shoots at a man who is approaching him because he believes him
to be his enemy B. and kills him, he is guilty of murder, although he sub-
sequently discovers that the man whom he has killed is his friend C, or ah
entire stranger. Such a mistake of identity makes no difference in the
quality and magnitude of the offence or in the amount of punishment due
to it. A. does in fact intend to kill the man whom he sees approaching
him ; and the fact that he erroneously believes him to be B. is immaterial.
So where A. poisoned food and laid it where he thought B. would find it
and eat it, but 0., against whom A. had no ill-will, saw it first, ate it and
died, A. was held guilty of- murder.
A. incites B. to kill C, a person unknown to B. A. describes C. to B.
and tells him where he will probably find C. at a certain hour. B. goes to
that place at that hour and kills D., who answers to the description which
A. gave of C. A. is an accessory before the fact to the murder of D.
A fugitive felon being pursued by the police enters a cottage and barricades
the door ; he declares that he will shoot the first man who enters the
cottage and does so, not knowing or caring who it is. He is guilty of
murder, for he has caused death with malice aforethought; it is not
necessary that the intention to kill should have been for any length of
time preconceived.
If a criminal resists capture by an officer of justice, and kills him in
order to escape, although he knows that he is an officer engaged in
executing his office, the criminal is guilty of murder ; for his act makes it
clear that he intended to kill the officer if he could not otherwise succeed
in escaping. 1
It is in every case for the jury to determine whether the
prisoner intended to kill or not. In most cases they can look
only at his acts or words, and infer from them his inward
intent. In some cases the existence of circumstances which
suggest a possible motive may be material. In all cases the
absence of any motive whatever for the crime will tell strongly
in the prisoner's favour. Any words which amount to a
threat to kill the deceased will also be material, 2 unless they
were spoken in great excitement or under the influence of
drink or were merely vulgar abuse. A man's acts, however,
are the best index to his intention. And whenever it is
sought to convict a man of murder by purely circumstantial
evidence, such evidence ought to be practically conclusive. 3
It is a well-known rule of our law that every man must be
presumed to know and to intend the natural and ordinary
consequences of his acts ; and he is liable for all such con-
1 See 1 Kussell on Crimes, 7th ed., pp. 721—728.
2 As, for instance, " You've got to die," in R. v. Linneker, [1906] 2 K. B. 99.
8 R. v. Franz (1861), 2F.ii. b\ at p. 583.