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Odger's English Common Law

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INTENTIONAL MANSLAUGHTER. 285<br />

I. Intentional Manslaughter.<br />

Cases have constantly occurred, in which death has been<br />

caused intentionally, but in circumstances which the law<br />

recognises as affording grave provocation to the accused. If,<br />

for instance, a sudden blow be struck and in the heat of the<br />

moment the blow be returned with fatal effect, the law will<br />

not deem this murder. For the presence of grave provocation<br />

rebuts any presumption of malice aforethought. The provo-<br />

cation, however, must be such as will produce ungovernable<br />

passion in a reasonable man and deprive him of his self-<br />

control. The fact that the accused is an excitable person,<br />

who flies into an ungovernable passion under very slight<br />

provocation, is immaterial if the jury find that a person of<br />

ordinary self-control would not have been so provoked. 1<br />

there be no sufficient provocation, every intentional homicide,<br />

which is not justifiable, is murder.<br />

Except in very special circumstances, no mere words or<br />

gestures, however insulting, will amount to sufficient provo-<br />

cation ;<br />

2 nor will a slight assault, such as a slap in the face<br />

with an open hand, or where a woman flung a ring in her<br />

lover's face. 8 But a trifling assault or battery, if accom-<br />

panied by words of gross insult, may amount to sufficient<br />

provocation ; for example, where a woman spat in a man's<br />

face, using at the same time insulting words of the grossest<br />

description. 4<br />

The mode of resentment must bear a reasonable<br />

proportion to the provocation received by the prisoner. Much<br />

depends, for instance, upon the instrument which caused the<br />

death ; if it were a deadly weapon, the provocation must be<br />

great indeed to reduce the offence to manslaughter ; but if<br />

the prisoner employed a weapon or other means not likely to<br />

produce death, a less serious degree of provocation will be<br />

sufficient. 5<br />

1 R. v. Lcsbini, [1914] 3 K. B. 1116 ; and see R. v. Welsh (1869), 11 Cox, 336, 338,<br />

and R. v. Alexander (1913), 23 Cox, 604.<br />

a R. v. Welsh, suprd ; see R. v. Jones (1908), 72 J. P. 215, and R. v. Phillis (1916),<br />

32 Times L. R. 414.<br />

' R. v. Palmer, [1913] 2 K. B. 29.<br />

' B. v. Smith (1866), 4 F. S F. 1066 ; B. v. Sherwood (1844), 1 C. & K. 566.<br />

« B. v. Eagle (1862), 2 F. S J. 827.<br />

If

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