Odger's English Common Law

CASES IN WHICH THERE IS NO GUILTY MIND. 125
show that the prisoner acted rashly and heedlessly with no
deliberate intent; for, although carelessness may amount to
mens rea, it cannot be malicious. Malice cannot be implied
from the mere circumstance that a man paid no heed to obvious
facts. It can be implied from the circumstance that he
wilfully shut his eyes to obvious facts on purpose not to see
them, for that shows that he knew that they existed.
(5) Cases in which there is no Guilty Mind.
We have assumed hitherto that the person accused of any
crime was of full age, sane and sober, and under no compul-
sion, delusion or mistake of fact, when he committed the
criminal act. The law also presumes this to be the case until
the contrary is shown. The onus lies on the accused to show
the contrary ; if he can do so he may escape criminal responsibility,
for his act will not make him guilty unless his mind
was guilty too.
The alleged criminal, then, must have a mind capable of
forming an intention, and capable also of understanding the
nature of the act which he contemplates, otherwise he cannot
have a guilty mind. He must know right from wrong. In
other words, he must possess both will and judgment, and be
free to exercise both. He is not criminally liable if he really
cannot help doing what he does.
Hence no man can commit a crime when he is asleep or
has been thoroughly drugged; for in such a state he is
incapable of forming an intention or of understanding the
nature of any act which he may do. But if a man chooses to
drink to excess and then commits a crime, his drunkenness
will afford him no defence ; for it was his own voluntary act
which reduced him to that condition. If, however, he be
charged with doing an act which is only criminal when done
with a special intent (e.g., murder, in which it is necessary to
prove malice aforethought), and he was so drunk that his
mind was incapable of forming that or any other intent, this
will be a defence to such a charge. 1
So actual delirium will
be a defence, although it is the result of voluntary drinking. 2
1 See M. v. Meade, [1909] 1 K. B. 895 ; M. v. Beard (1919), 14 Cr. App. Rep. 110,
and (H. L ) The limes, March 6th, 1920.
2 See R. v. Davis (1881), 14 Cox, 563.