Odger's English Common Law

476 TRESPASS TO THE PERSON.
other submits, this is an imprisonment, whether there was
any lawful authority or not.
Thus, the wrongful removal of a prisoner from one part of a prison to
another and his detention there will be a good cause of action for
trespass and false imprisonment, to which even the Home Secretary may
be liable, if the plaintiff was removed under a general order issued by him
for the classification of the prisoners, which he had no legal authority to
make. 1
So, too, the retention of a prisoner for one day beyond his term of
imprisonment would render the governor of the gaol liable. 2
Again, where warders detained for inquiries a man who had been
acquitted of a criminal charge at Quarter Sessions, it was held that this
was a false imprisonment for which the governor of the prison was liable. 3
As a false imprisonment is a trespass to the person, the
plaintiff need not show that he has sustained any pecuniary
loss through the action of the defendant. He is entitled to
general damages for the interference with his liberty. But
if he has in fact sustained any special damage, this should be
expressly claimed in his pleading and must be strictly proved
at the trial. And only such damage can be recovered as
flows directly from the defendant's act.
Thus, it has been held that a plaintiff can recover damages for such
indignities as being handcuffed, being washed and having his hair cut, but not
for any violence or ill-treatment on the part of the police officers ;
for that
would not be a necessary consequence of the defendant's act which brought
about the plaintiff's imprisonment. 4 So a justice of the peace is not liable
for the prolonged imprisonment caused by a remand. 5 But if after holding
an inquest without jurisdiction a coroner issues a warrant against the
plaintiff, he can, in a subsequent action against the coroner for false
imprisonment, recover back as special damage the expense to which he
had been put in getting the coroner's inquisition quashed. 6
We now proceed to consider the defences open to a defen-
dant in an action of false imprisonment :
(a) The defendant is sometimes in a position to show that
he held a warrant from a magistrate, authorising the arrest.
No action will lie for the arrest complained of, if it was made
—
1 Cobbett v. Grey (1850), 4 Exoh. 729.
2 See Migoiti v. Colvill (1879), 4 C. P. D. 233.
8 Mee v. Cruihshanh (1902), 86 L. T. 708.
4 Mason v. Barker (1843), 1 Car. & K. 100.
6 Lock v. Athton (1848), 12 Q. B. 871.
« Woxhall v. Barnett (1863), 2 E. & B. 928.