Odger's English Common Law

286
MANSLAUGHTER.
Thus, if A. uses provoking language or behaviour towards B. and B.
strikes him, whereupon a combat ensues in which A. is killed, B. is guilty
of manslaughter and not murder ; for the affray was sudden, the parties
fought upon equal terms, and in such combats, upon sudden quarrels, it
matters not who gave the first blow. 1
Where a woman struck a soldier in the face, and he thereupon drew his
sword and ran her through, the provocation, coming from a woman, was
deemed at first insufficient, and the judge directed the jury to return a
verdict of murder. But on its subsequently appearing that the blow was
struck with an iron patten, and was so severe as to leave a scar upon the
prisoner's face, the judge told them that they might find the prisoner
guilty of manslaughter. 2
Again, a husband, who unexpectedly discovers his wife in the act of
adultery, has sufficient provocation to reduce the immediate killing of the
wife or paramour to manslaughter. 3 So where a man suddenly heard from
his wife that she had committed adultery—a thing of which he had no
previous suspicion—and he thereupon killed her, though in strict law this
is murder, the judge allowed the jury to reduce it to manslaughter.* But this
is an extreme case, and the doctrine enunciated in it will not be extended.
Thus the Court has refused to follow it in the case of persons only engaged
to be married 5 or of a woman living with a man as his wife. 8 A fortiori
a mere threat of future adultery uttered by a wife will not be a sufficient
provocation, nor an unfounded suspicion that the murdered man had com-
mitted adultery with the prisoner's wife. 7 And no neglect, however gross,
by a mother of her household and maternal duties will be any excuse for
•the murder by the father of his suffering child. 8
The employment of unlawful force by A. against B. or any
unlawful arrest or imprisonment of B. by A. is provocation
sufficient to reduce the subsequent killing of A. by B. (but
by no one else) from murder to manslaughter. 9 The employment
of lawful force against B. is in law no provocation, if
B has reason to know that the force used against him is
lawful.
If B. forcibly resists an officer of justice in the execution of his duty
-and thus causes his death, he is guilty of murder provided he knew that
the other was an officer of justice and was then employed in the execution of
.his duty. 10 Excessive resistance even to an unlawful arrest is criminal,
i Foster's Crown Cases, 295 ; B. v. Lord Byron (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1177.
2 B. v. Stedman (1704), Foster's Crown Cases, 292.
* B. v. Manning (1672), Sir T. Raym. 212 ; B. v. Pearson (1835), 2 Lewin, 216.
* B. v. Bothwell (1871), 12 Cox, 145 ; B. v. Jones (1908), 72 J. P. 215.
8 R. v. Palmer, [19 1 3] 2 K. B. 29.
6 R. v. Greening, [1913] 3 K. B. 846.
1
8
R. v. Birchall (1013), 23 Cox. 579.
R. v. Simpson (1 915), 84 L J. K. B. 1893.
9 See B. v. Stevenson (1759),
-M See ante, p. 276.
19 St. Tr. 846.