Odger's English Common Law

GUILTY KNOWLEDGE. 383
thief, he may be convicted ; it is otherwise where he merely
negotiates for the sale of stolen goods which are wholly in
the possession of another. 1
Thus, possession of stolen goods by a servant may be possession by his
master if the master knew that they were in the possession of his servant. 2
In consequence of the rule that there must be a change of possession,
it was formerly held that a wife could not be convicted for receiving from
her husband goods which she knew he had stolen ; for her possession was
his possession. But now it is clear that a married woman can be in
possession, apart from her husband, of articles of feminine attire, and of
other things which are part of her separate estate. 3 Hence, if a married
woman receives such goods as a gift from her husband, knowing them to
have been stolen, she may be convicted. A husband, who received from
his wife goods which she had stolen, could always be convicted of receiving. 4
(iii.) Lastly, the prosecution must prove that at the time
he received the goods the prisoner knew that they were
stolen. If he originally received them innocently, he cannot
be convicted of this offence, although he retained them in his
possession after he had learnt that they were stolen.
Any facts which would have raised suspicion in the mind
of a reasonable man will be evidence to go to the jury on
this issue. Thus the jury may be asked to infer the guilty
knowledge of the prisoner from the facts of the case proved
before them, e.g., that the goods were brought to him by
night, that he bought them at a price much under their real
value, that when charged he denied that he had them in his
possession, or that he gave at different times conflicting
accounts of how he came by them.
Again, the person who stole the goods can be called to
prove the guilty knowledge of the receiver. Formerly, how-
ever, judges were very reluctant to allow the receiver to be
convicted where the only evidence against him was that of
the thief, who was an accomplice; the mere fact that the
stolen property was found on the prisoner's premises was not
considered sufficient corroboration of the evidence of the
1 R. v. Watson, [1916] 2 K. B. 385.
» R. v. Pearsm (2) (1908), 72 J. P. ib\.
» See the Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45& 46 Vict. c. 75), ss. 12, 16 ;
and B. v. Payne, [19CG] 1 K. 7!. '.'.".
i B. v. M f Athey (1862), 32 L. .1 T.t. C. UJ.