Odger's English Common Law

INTENTION TO KILL. 277
sequences, even though he never intended or contemplated
that they would follow. This presumption is no doubt
rebuttable in certain cases. 1 But if a man is aware that
certain consequences will probably follow the act which he
contemplates and yet deliberately proceeds to do that act, he
must be taken to have intended those consequences to follow,
even though he may have hoped that they would not.
If A. presents a loaded revolver at B.'s head and pulls the trigger, it is
an almost irresistible inference from these facts that A. intended to kill B.
Nor will the mere fact that he did not know for certain and took no pains
to ascertain whether the revolver was loaded or not, in any way excuse
the act.
But the inference may be rebutted by clear proof that A. honestly and
on good grounds believed that the revolver was unloaded. Take, for
instance, the case reported by Foster, J. 2 :—A. went one Sunday with
his wife to have dinner at a friend's house. Before entering the house
he discharged his gun. During his visit his friend's son, going out
shooting, took A.'s gun and on his return replaced it loaded where he had
found it. A. afterwards returned home with his wife, taking his gun with
him, and feeling certain that it was unloaded, presented it at his wife,
pressed the trigger and to his horror shot his wife dead. He was acquitted ;
for, on the facts as known to him, it was impossible that his act should cause
death.
Again, where the accused was drunk at the time when he struck the
fatal blow, the condition of his mind may be urged upon the jury as a
ground for reducing the crime to manslaughter ; for it lessens the pro-
bability that he had formed any intention to kill. The presumption of such
an intention drawn from his act will be rebutted by proof that he was in such
a state of drunkenness that he was incapable of forming any such inten-
tion. 3
It is not necessary for him to prove that his state of mind was one
bordering on insanity. On the other hand, it is no defence to prove merely
that he was drunk. It must be shown " that his mind is so affected by the
drink he has taken that he is incapable of knowing that what he is doing
is dangerous, i.e., likely to inflict serious injury." 4
But cases may arise in which it is quite clear that as a
matter of fact the prisoner did not intend to cause death
or grievous bodily harm to any one. Nevertheless, as the
law stands at present, he may be found guilty of murder in a
few such cases, and then malice aforethought is said to be
1 Per cur. in B. v. Meade, [1909] 1 K. B. at p. 899 ; and see ante, p. 116.
2 Anon. (1750 cired), Foster's Crown Oases, 265.
8 R. v. Oriiidley (1819), 1 Russell on Crimes, 7th ed., 88 (b) ; R. v. JDoherty (1887),
16 Cox, 306.
4 Per cur. in R. v. Meade, supra; and see R. v. Beard (1919), 14 Cr. App. Rep.
110, and (H.L.) The Times, March 6th, 1920.