Odger's English Common Law

438 TORTS GENERALLY
But if a judgment has been actually obtained in an action of
tort, the claim ceases, of course, to be unliquidated, and the
judgment debt must be proved in the defendant's bank-
ruptcy.
The marriage of a female defendant affords no defence to
an action brought against her for a tort committed either
before or after her marriage. She can in both cases be sued
as a feme sole. In the case of a tort committed by her
before the marriage, her husband is liable to the extent only
of any property he may have received from her on the
marriage. 1
In the case of any tort committed by her after
the marriage, the unfortunate husband is liable to the full
extent and has no right of action over against her separate
estate to recoup himself. 2
.
She can, of course, sue by herself
or with her husband for a wrong done to her before or after
marriage.
A right of action for a tort may also be waived, either
expressly or by the conduct of the parties ; it may also be
discharged by an accord and satisfaction or a release by a
deed under seal. 3 A judgment against one of two or more
joint tortfeasors operates as a release to the other or others. 4
In a few cases tender of amends has been made by statute a
defence to an action of tort. 5
Lastly, a right of action for a tort may be barred by the
operation of the Statutes of Limitation. Different periods
are assigned by different statutes. An action against any
one for an act done in pursuance of, or for any neglect of
duty under, any Act of Parliament or any public duty or
authority must be brought within six months of the date of
the act or omission complained of. 6 An action of slander for
words actionable per se must be brought '
' within two years
next after the words spoken." 7 Whenever the words are
actionable only by reason of special damage, the time doe's
1 46 & 46 Vict. c. 75, ss. 13—15.
2
lb. s. 1 ; and see Seroka and wife v. Kattenburg and wife (1886), 17 Q. B. D.
177; Earle\. Kingacote, |"1900] 1 Ch. 203.
s See Jones v. Broadhurst (1850), 9 0. B. 173 ; Steeds v. Steeds (1889), 22
Q. B. D. 537 ; and post, pp. 763, 761.
i Brinsmead v. HarHsOn (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 647.
6 See the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (66 & 57 Vict. c. 61), s. 1 (c).
6 lb. s. 1 (a).
i Limitation Act, 1623 (21 Jac. I c. 16), s. 3.