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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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90 The Unconditioned and the Infinite Series<br />

such but rather the arguments in these proofs adduced to refute<br />

thesis and antithesis.<br />

As presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, the First<br />

Antinomy reads:<br />

Thesis<br />

The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space.<br />

Antithesis<br />

The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards<br />

both time and space. (B454-55)<br />

The refutation of the thesis presented at the end of the antinomies<br />

chapter in the "Solution of the Cosmological Idea" is the<br />

same as that presented in the "proof" of the antithesis: The thesis is<br />

said to imply an empty time before the world (or an empty space outside<br />

it). In an empty time nothing can happen, including an origin<br />

of the world; such an origin cannot be the object of a possible experience.<br />

At the end of the Analytic in the "Amphibolies" chapter Kant<br />

called the notion of an empty time (an empty space) a "nothing," an<br />

"empty intuition without object ens imaginarium" (B348). The<br />

attempt nonetheless to conceive this "nothing" results in an — as a<br />

rule theologically articulated — equivocation with the word "world,"<br />

whereby we imagine a (non-material) "world" before the world, in<br />

which material systems can arise. Kemp Smith, for instance,<br />

writes: 41<br />

If Kant means by it [the term "world"] merely the material world, the<br />

assumption of its non-existence does not leave only empty time and space.<br />

Other kinds of existence may be possible, and in these a sufficient cause of<br />

its first beginnings may be found. The nature of creative activity will remain<br />

mysterious and incomprehensible, but that is no sufficient reason for<br />

denying its possibility.<br />

Kant of course does not deny the possibility of creative activity; on the<br />

contrary, he asserts, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny<br />

knowledge, in order to make room for faith" (Bxxx). He denies only<br />

that such creative activity could be the object of possible empirical<br />

experience; and the antinomies are supposed to arise not out of<br />

propositions of faith but out of purported knowledge.<br />

The refutation of the antithesis, on the other hand, which<br />

posited the infinity of the past, is supplemented in the "solution" section<br />

by a number of remarks on the question of whether the regress<br />

backwards in time can proceed in infinitum or only in indefinitum.<br />

41 Kemp Smith, Commentary, p. 487.

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