KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Appearance of a Solution 149
On the other hand, as far as the first presented maxim of a reflective
judgment is concerned, it does not in fact contain any contradiction at all.
(B315; CJ, *267)
Although it is grammatically unambiguous that only one maxim is
being dealt with, about which it is asserted that it does not contradict
itself, the sentence is normally interpreted — and accordingly also
translated — as if Kant were maintaining that the two maxims do
not contradict one another. 19 Although it may be difficult to imagine
why Kant should want to assert that the first maxim is not selfcontradictory
(for who would disagree?), nevertheless, he says it and
it is also true. On the other hand the assertion that the two maxims
(R1 and R2) are not incompatible is plainly and straightforwardly
false. For purely methodological reasons it is illegitimate to attribute
to Kant an obviously false assertion which is contrary to his explicit
words and their literal meaning. (I shall return to some of the
misgivings which certainly remain about this argument after
dealing with the second passage often cited in this context.)
The only passage whose literal interpretation seems to indicate
that Kant himself at least believed that the antinomy was
already resolved by the distinction between regulative and constitutive
principles is the last paragraph of §71:
Hence all semblance of an antinomy between the maxims of strictly
physical (mechanical) and teleological (technical) explanation rests on our
confusing a principle of reflective judgment with one of determinative
judgment, and on our confusing the autonomy of reflective judgment (which
holds merely subjectively for our use of reason regarding the particular
empirical laws) with the heteronomy of determinative judgment, which must
conform to the laws (universal or particular) that are given by
understanding. (B318-9; CJ, 270; emphasis PM)
The assertion seems rather clear (compare Hegel's paraphrase
quoted above): The antinomy is based on the confusion of regulative
and constitutive principles, of reflective and determinate judgment.
Indeed, if one considers this paragraph in isolation, there is no
other interpretation that is in any way nearly as plausible. It might
be supposed that the standard interpretation of the antinomy is
more or less mandatory in view of such a passage. Nonetheless, if
19 All three available English translations (including Pluhar's otherwise
excellent new translation) mistranslate this sentence. The German reads: "Was
dagegen die zuerst vorgetragene Maxime einer reflektierenden Urteilskraft
betrifft, so enthält sie in der Tat gar keinen Widerspruch." Cf. also Sievert, 454;
H.W. Cassirer, 345; Zumbach, Transcendent Science, 131.