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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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112 Antinomy of Freedom<br />

of momentum in the system of the world. 71 The position thus under<br />

discussion is the purported ability of the will to introduce new force<br />

(energy) into the material world and the need to appeal to this "fact"<br />

in the explanation of nature. In any case, a great deal more sense<br />

can be made of the Third Antinomy if we take it to be dealing with<br />

the apparent contradiction between the conservation of motion<br />

(causal closure of the material world) and the causal efficacy of the<br />

will.<br />

Subcontrary Oppositions<br />

To clarify the formal structure of the antinomy, I shall follow<br />

Michael Wolff and present the apparent contradiction in the following<br />

form: 72<br />

Thesis: Some things act spontaneously (are free).<br />

Antithesis: No things act spontaneously (are free).<br />

("Spontaneous" is taken to mean: able on its own to initiate a causal<br />

chain.)<br />

Kant's proofs for the thesis and antithesis need not detain us<br />

here; they are as usual apagogical. The schema of finite and infinite<br />

series is continued in the proofs and refutations; however, in the<br />

resolution section at the end of the antinomies chapter (B560-587)<br />

this semblance of uniformity is abandoned, and the infinite series<br />

disappear without a trace. We know that Kant considers the thesis<br />

to be false because it sins against the category of causality. Why the<br />

antithesis is taken to be false becomes clear only after a number of<br />

arguments in the resolution section, which will be presented below.<br />

For the moment we can say that the problem with both propositions<br />

is that they do not distinguish between things in themselves and<br />

appearances and extend their assertions to both realms: For<br />

instance, "some phenomenal things act spontaneously," is simply<br />

false, for things that are not completely causally determined do not<br />

71 Metaphysical Foundations, A154; Ak 4,562-3; W 5,132-3. Although Kant in the<br />

preface characterized "genuine" science as being apodictically true, this is his<br />

only explicit claim in the entire book to have shown something to be apodictically<br />

true.<br />

72 Cf. Wolff, Der Begriff, p.57.

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