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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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Summary 179<br />

mechanistic explanation of the organism may perhaps never be<br />

successful without abandoning mechanism as the ideal of explanation.<br />

3.6 Summary<br />

The point of departure of the Dialectic of teleological judgement<br />

was an apparent contradiction in the central concept of Kant's<br />

analysis of biological explanation, the natural purpose. This concept<br />

had been introduced to deal with the peculiar causal relations in an<br />

organism. But, as has been stressed, the actual problem for Kant,<br />

and for philosophy, is not the organism or life as such, but rather<br />

the discrepancy between the mechanistic ideal of explanation and<br />

the actual explanations given in biology. The organism is not a problem<br />

for philosophy but for biology. The way that biologists explain<br />

the organism to their own satisfaction may however pose a problem<br />

for philosophy if it does not conform to the ideal which philosophers<br />

consider universally valid. The first problem that Kant saw in the<br />

explanation of the organism was the underdetermination of the<br />

structure of the organism by the properties of its parts: The necessity<br />

of precisely this and only this structure given these particular<br />

parts could only be grasped if an additional causality according to<br />

purposes was assumed. The second problem lay in the fact that<br />

these structures or organizational forms have certain abilities<br />

which occasion further explanatory difficulties, in particular the<br />

ability of the whole to confer new properties on its parts.<br />

Kant brings the discrepancy mentioned to a head and formulates<br />

it as a direct contradiction using the argumentational figure of<br />

the antinomy, in order to pose and resolve the problem in principle.<br />

The solution lies in the introduction of a conceptual distinction<br />

between mechanism and causality such that mechanism is determined<br />

as a species of the genus causality whose differentia specifica<br />

consists in the stipulation of the determination of the whole by the<br />

parts. Causality itself remains as one of the categories constitutive<br />

of the objects of experience, but mechanism has only subjective<br />

validity in as much as it rests on a peculiarity of our understanding<br />

that is not constitutive of nature. Due to this peculiarity of our<br />

understanding we cannot understand, conceive, or even "become

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