KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
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Summary 179<br />
mechanistic explanation of the organism may perhaps never be<br />
successful without abandoning mechanism as the ideal of explanation.<br />
3.6 Summary<br />
The point of departure of the Dialectic of teleological judgement<br />
was an apparent contradiction in the central concept of Kant's<br />
analysis of biological explanation, the natural purpose. This concept<br />
had been introduced to deal with the peculiar causal relations in an<br />
organism. But, as has been stressed, the actual problem for Kant,<br />
and for philosophy, is not the organism or life as such, but rather<br />
the discrepancy between the mechanistic ideal of explanation and<br />
the actual explanations given in biology. The organism is not a problem<br />
for philosophy but for biology. The way that biologists explain<br />
the organism to their own satisfaction may however pose a problem<br />
for philosophy if it does not conform to the ideal which philosophers<br />
consider universally valid. The first problem that Kant saw in the<br />
explanation of the organism was the underdetermination of the<br />
structure of the organism by the properties of its parts: The necessity<br />
of precisely this and only this structure given these particular<br />
parts could only be grasped if an additional causality according to<br />
purposes was assumed. The second problem lay in the fact that<br />
these structures or organizational forms have certain abilities<br />
which occasion further explanatory difficulties, in particular the<br />
ability of the whole to confer new properties on its parts.<br />
Kant brings the discrepancy mentioned to a head and formulates<br />
it as a direct contradiction using the argumentational figure of<br />
the antinomy, in order to pose and resolve the problem in principle.<br />
The solution lies in the introduction of a conceptual distinction<br />
between mechanism and causality such that mechanism is determined<br />
as a species of the genus causality whose differentia specifica<br />
consists in the stipulation of the determination of the whole by the<br />
parts. Causality itself remains as one of the categories constitutive<br />
of the objects of experience, but mechanism has only subjective<br />
validity in as much as it rests on a peculiarity of our understanding<br />
that is not constitutive of nature. Due to this peculiarity of our<br />
understanding we cannot understand, conceive, or even "become