KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

70 Kant's Logic
In contrast to Lambert, Kant does not speak of infinite terms
but rather of negative terms or predicates or simply "negations"
(Verneinungen), which are the opposite of affirmative terms. This
is significant in as much as Kant considers such predicates as
being logically opposed to one another or even "contradictorily
opposed" even when they are not joined together in a judgment. 25
According to its logical form, says Kant, an infinite judgment is
affirmative since it uses the simple copula "est"; but in terms of
content the judgment is negative, which affects its role, for instance,
in a syllogism. In a later metaphysics lecture Kant remarks that the
"infinita are affirmative judgments with regard to the copula, or
negative with regard to the predicate. E.g. anima est nonmortalis."
26 In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant justifies the
distinction with a reference to the differing intentions of "general"
and "transcendental" logic.
In like manner infinite judgments must, in transcendental logic, be distinguished
from those that are affirmative, although in general logic they are
rightly classed with them, and do not constitute a separate member of the
division. General logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even
though it be negative); it enquires only whether the predicate be ascribed to
the subject or opposed to it. But transcendental logic also considers what
may be the value or content of this logical affirmation made by means of a
merely negative predicate, and what is thereby gained with respect to our
total knowledge. (B*97)
It seems at first glance that Kant admits openly that distinguishing
infinite judgments as a special kind of judgment does not belong to
logic proper and that the distinction is only imported into logic from
transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, many commentators have
interpreted him as not deriving the categories from the logical functions
of the understanding but rather as determining the forms of
judgment according to the already invented categories. 27 However,
from later reflections and lecture notes it seems clear that Kant considered
the distinction of infinite judgments from affirmative and
negative to be part of logic. Lorenz Krüger has made the reasonable
suggestion that we interpret the expression "transcendental logic"
25 On "contradictorily opposed" predicates or determinations, cf. B48, B298, B486,
B599ff. Kant considers two predicates (terms) such as B and non-B to be logically
opposed.
26 Ak 29.1,985; the hyphen in "non-mortalis" was (justifiably) inserted by the
editors of the "Academy" edition.
27 Cf. Krüger, "Wollte Kant...?" for a discussion of various commentators.