KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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176 Resolution of the Antinomy method. A good illustration of this way of thinking is provided by Robert Boyle: 29 And thus in this great automaton, the world (as in a watch or clock) the materials it consists of being left to themselves, could never at first convene into so curious an engine: and yet when the skilful artist has once made and set it going, the phenomena it exhibits are to be accounted for by the number, bigness, proportion, shape, motion (or endeavour) rest, coaptation, and other mechanical affections of the spring, wheels, pillars, and other parts it is made up of: and those effects of such a watch that cannot this way be explicated must, for aught I know, be confessed not to be sufficiently understood. It is the reductionism of this method that Kant wants to make binding as a peculiarity of our understanding for all knowledge. The method of science and its presuppositions are not considered to be constitutive of nature but to be necessary regulative principles for an understanding like ours. Kant does not say that science as it in fact arose historically can only explain things in a mechanistic manner and that we therefore ought to judge thing to be possible according to mechanical laws; rather he maintains that our understanding cannot do otherwise. It is not that our conceptual instruments force us to reduce a whole to its parts (because we in fact have no other such instruments), rather, he says, our understanding is so constituted that we have no other way of explaining things in principle. The method of classical modern physics is equated with scientific explanation in general and the latter is equated with knowledge as such. This is anchored in the "constitution" of our understanding, so that this way of thinking seems not to be one that arose in the course of history but to be one that is systematically simply given. On the textual basis available I cannot of course prove that Kant is indeed referring in §77 to the specific use of the analytic-synthetic method in modern science, although there is much to indicate this. It is however not necessary to prove this since the point was merely to show that, even in the case of this second peculiarity of our understanding, Kant's occasionally psychologizing manner of expression can be given a consistent epistemological sense. Thus, a psychological interpretation with all its problems is by no means necessitated by the text. 29 Boyle, "Forms and Qualities," p. 48-49 (emphasis PM).
Mechanism and Teleology 177 Mechanism and Teleology After the apparent contradiction between the general necessity and the occasional impossibility of an exclusively mechanistic explanation of all natural phenomena has been resolved, teleological explanation proper must still be reconciled with mechanism. In general there is no opposition between mechanism and teleology, just as little as there is an opposition between the tools of an artisan and the plan according to which he employs them. Ideal and real causes play a part in every process of production. A problem can only then arise if the object to be explained is supposed to be a product of nature. Even though the necessity of the regulative maxims is merely subjective, nonetheless, the assumption that a thing is mechanistically explainable, i.e. is a product of nature, could come into conflict with the assumption that a purpose is also the cause of the product. To resolve this possible conflict, Kant introduces the supersensible, so that a certain analogy to the resolution of the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason arises, which has led a number of commentators to read the antinomy of judgment as a mere repeat of the antinomy of freedom and determinism. However as was shown above (3.2), the conflict between mechanism and teleology can arise only after the antinomy itself has already been resolved. In order to prove that an object of experience can simultaneously be a product of nature and of a purpose, Kant reminds us that the objects of experience are the appearances of a supersensible substrate and maintains that in the supersensible both the mechanical and the teleological grounds of the possibility of such a product are reconcilable. For instance, if an object, e.g. a maggot, could be explained as the product of the mechanism of nature, we could nonetheless assume without self contradiction that the mechanism only executes the purposes of a supersensible being. On the other hand, if we assume that something is the appearance of a supersensible purpose, we can still maintain without contradiction that the realization of the purpose was carried out by mechanical laws. For where we think purposes as bases that make certain things possible, we must also assume means whose causal law does not itself require
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KANT’S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN B
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Contents Acknowledgments...........
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Acknowledgements vii This book pres
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To My Parents M.M.M. and P.O.M.
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2 Introduction fact the rejection o
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4 Introduction almost exclusively c
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6 Introduction reductionism as the
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8 Theory of the Organism will be se
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10 Theory of the Organism when he f
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12 Theory of the Organism that this
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14 Theory of the Organism not in an
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16 Theory of the Organism formation
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18 Theory of the Organism common sp
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20 Theory of the Organism cated to
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22 Theory of the Organism by these
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24 Kant's Reading of Biology of the
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26 Kant's Reading of Biology for in
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28 Kant's Reading of Biology monly
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30 Kant's Reading of Biology not be
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32 Kant's Reading of Biology to ada
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34 Analytic of Teleological Judgmen
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54 Antinomies of Reason tent is par
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56 Antinomies of Reason antinomies
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58 Antinomies of Reason shows that
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60 Antinomies of Reason categories
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62 Antinomies of Reason "only condi
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64 Antinomies of Reason described;
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66 Kant's Logic For the true opposi
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68 Kant's Logic outside the sphere
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70 Kant's Logic In contrast to Lamb
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72 Kant's Logic predicate under con
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74 Kant's Logic other. We can thus
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76 Kant's Logic then both conflicti
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78 Kant's Logic Both conflicting pr
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80 The Unconditioned and the Infini
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98 Antinomy of Division Antithesis
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100 Antinomy of Division justificat
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102 Antinomy of Division and thus p
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104 Antinomy of Division why it is
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106 Antinomy of Division B552-53) g
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108 Antinomy of Division "machine"
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110 Antinomy of Freedom How far the
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112 Antinomy of Freedom of momentum
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114 Antinomy of Freedom the Third a
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116 Antinomy of Freedom If Kant mea
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118 Antinomy of Freedom phenomena i
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120 Antinomy of Freedom In the Crit
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122 Antinomy of Freedom must appear
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124 Systematics of Antinomy I do no
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Page 138 and 139: 128 Antinomy of Judgment An antinom
Page 140 and 141: 130 Antinomy of Judgment §74 The r
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Page 144 and 145: 134 Antinomy of Judgment dialectic.
Page 146 and 147: 136 Antinomy of Judgment we cannot
Page 148 and 149: 138 Interpretations of the Antinomy
Page 162 and 163: 152 Heuristic but Necessary Princip
Page 172 and 173: 162 Resolution of the Antinomy the
Page 174 and 175: 164 Resolution of the Antinomy know
Page 176 and 177: 166 Resolution of the Antinomy a wh
Page 178 and 179: 168 Resolution of the Antinomy able
Page 180 and 181: 170 Resolution of the Antinomy ous
Page 182 and 183: 172 Resolution of the Antinomy intr
Page 184 and 185: 174 Resolution of the Antinomy tion
Page 188 and 189: 178 Resolution of the Antinomy anyt
Page 190: 180 Summary acquainted with" a caus
Page 194 and 195: 184 Bibliography Bommersheim, Paul,
Page 196 and 197: 186 Bibliography Fraisse, Jean Clau
Page 198 and 199: 188 Bibliography Kraemer, Eric Russ
Page 200 and 201: 190 Bibliography & E. Mendelsohn) B
Page 202 and 203: 192 Bibliography Roretz, Karl, "Zur
Page 204 and 205: 194 Bibliography American and Conti
Page 206 and 207: 196 Index 144; 154; 167; 169; final
Page 208 and 209: 198 Index mere understanding 47; 13
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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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