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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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62 Antinomies of Reason<br />

"only conditionally false." 12 What Kant states explicitly for the Third<br />

Antinomy clearly holds implicitly for the others. I shall explain this<br />

briefly.<br />

The apagogical form of proof used in the antinomies chapter<br />

has, along with important technical functions that will be discussed<br />

below, the function of giving the thesis position some initial plausibility<br />

without compelling Kant to provide any direct justification —<br />

which he would certainly have found very difficult. As long as the<br />

thesis can be presented as the only alternative to the antithesis, it<br />

can be made as strong as the antithesis is made weak. The refutation<br />

of the antitheses in the four antinomies demands an intricate<br />

and difficult argumentation that sometimes seems to presuppose at<br />

least some of the results of the critique of reason that the refutations<br />

themselves were supposed to support. The refutation of the theses,<br />

on the other hand, is comparatively easy. For example, Kant's refutation<br />

of the thesis of the First Antinomy (discussed in detail below),<br />

which postulated an empty time before the world, consists in declaring<br />

the notion to be unintelligible. The thesis of the Second<br />

Antinomy, physical atomism, is said to be self-contradictory; in<br />

other writings Kant even uses the proposition, "All bodies are divisible,"<br />

as the paradigm of an analytic statement and the assertion<br />

that an extended body is indivisible as an example of a logical<br />

contradiction. 13 The thesis of the Third Antinomy, which as we<br />

shall see in Section 2.5 denies that the material world is causally<br />

closed, is incompatible with natural science as we know it, since it<br />

denies the principle of conservation in a material system, allowing<br />

non-material "active principles" to act in the world and thus<br />

implying that some physical events have non-physical causes.<br />

According to Kant, however, not even God himself could contravene<br />

the conservation laws, for this would be absurd. 14<br />

12 Critique of Practical Reason, A206<br />

13 Cf. Prolegomena, §2; "Über eine Entdeckung," (Ak 8,229; W 3,347). In the<br />

"Progress of Metaphysics" Kant asserts: "For instance, the statement: 'every<br />

body is divisible' does in fact have a ground, and a ground in itself, i.e. it can be<br />

understood as inferring the predicate out of the concept of the subject according to<br />

the law of non-contradiction and thus according to the principle of analytic<br />

judgments." (Ak 20,278; W 3,611)<br />

14 If the vector sum of all 'forces' (mv) is not conserved and does not remain<br />

equal to zero, then the position of the center of mass of the material world changes;<br />

given the dynamic equivalence of a system and its center of mass, this implies a<br />

motion of the universe in absolute space. In one of the so-called "Kiesewetter

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