KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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42 Analytic of Teleological Judgment character on the example of an organism, pointing "for example, to the structure of birds regarding how their bones are hollow, how their wings are positioned to produce motion and their tails to permit steering and so on" (B268f; CJ, 236). There seems to be no reason why nature as a mere mechanism should have chosen precisely this composition of parts instead of thousands of other possible combinations of the parts; without recourse to the causality of purpose, this structure must appear "utterly contingent". Thus wherever particular phenomena seem to be underdetermined (accidental) by "mere mechanism," we introduce objective purposiveness as a regulative principle. We view the phenomenon as if a concept of the phenomenon had guided its production. For we adduce a teleological basis when we attribute to the concept of an object — just as if that concept were in nature (not in us) — a causality concerning an object, or, rather, when we conceive of the object's possibility by analogy with such a causality (which we find in ourselves) and so think nature as technical in what it itself can do. (§ 61, B269-70; CJ, 237) Kant emphasizes that we may not consider such teleological grounds to be real causes (but only "Erkenntnisgründe" as he later elaborates); their postulation is a regulative principle. First (§62), Kant divides objective purposiveness into a formal and a material version. His examples of formal purposiveness are all taken from mathematics: geometric figures such as conic sections are "fertile in principles for solving a multitude of possible problems" (B272; CJ, 240). Such "objects" of our formal intuition can be unexpectedly useful with regard to other objects of our formal intuition. But this kind of purposiveness plays no role in the subsequent analysis. Much more important than the formal, however, is the material purposiveness, which has to do with real objects of material reality. Kant distinguishes (§63) a relative (extrinsic) and an intrinsic (absolute) purposiveness. 30 Experience prompts us to introduce the concept of material purposiveness only when we have to deal with particular objects whose explanation causes us particular problems. With certain particularly complicated systems we may assume a relative purposiveness of one part for another in order to facilitate the investigation of the interrelationships; with some objects, on the other hand, we must assume an intrinsic purposive- 30 Intrinsic purposiveness is also called "absolute" only in the so-called "First Introduction," Ak 20,217; W 5,194; CJ, 405.
Analysis of Purpose 43 ness in order to explain them at all. Such objects of experience can only be comprehended as law governed and causally determined under certain conditions, namely, that the concept or representation of the object guided the efficient causes of the object in its production. Or as Kant puts it: Only in one case does experience lead our power of judgment to the concept of a purposiveness that is both objective and material, i.e., to the concept of a purpose of nature, namely, when we have to judge a relation of cause to effect which is such that we can see it as law-governed only if we regard the cause's action as based on the idea of the effect, with this idea as the underlying condition under which the cause itself can produce that effect. (B278; CJ, 244) Although in such a case we can comprehend the lawful character of the process only if we assume that an idea of the result guides the process, we do not assume that there really exists an understanding that has the idea. This idea is a cognitive tool of ours, it is not an intention actually supposed to be realized by any understanding agent. Relative purposiveness includes the usefulness of one thing for another. Kant speaks of the "utility" of a thing for humans and its "benefit" for other living creatures. Any thing that can serve as a means for some other thing may be said to be relatively purposive, whereby the "other thing" in Kant's examples is always an organism. Kant lists a number of such relatively purposive natural relationships, such as the benefit of sandy soil for spruce trees or of rivers for plants. He points out however that the relative purposiveness of a thing depends on the purpose-character of the creature for which it is beneficial. Only if we were to assume that the existence of certain things were a purpose of nature, would we have to consider "those natural things that are indispensable for this" as natural purposes (B282; CJ, 246). But we have no empirical or logical reasons to believe that any particular thing or kind of thing ought to exist; this applies to humans as well. The relative purposiveness of one thing for another never justifies the inference that the purposive thing can only be thought to be possible in this connection. The relative purposiveness of one thing for another is never a necessary component of the explanation of the thing's origin. "For even if there were none of that natural utility, we would find that natural causes are fully adequate to make things come out this way" (B284; CJ, 247). The origin of the sandy soil so beneficial for the spruce trees can be completely explained without
Page 1: KANT’S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN B
Page 5 and 6: Contents Acknowledgments...........
Page 7 and 8: Acknowledgements vii This book pres
Page 9: To My Parents M.M.M. and P.O.M.
Page 12 and 13: 2 Introduction fact the rejection o
Page 14 and 15: 4 Introduction almost exclusively c
Page 16 and 17: 6 Introduction reductionism as the
Page 18 and 19: 8 Theory of the Organism will be se
Page 20 and 21: 10 Theory of the Organism when he f
Page 22 and 23: 12 Theory of the Organism that this
Page 24 and 25: 14 Theory of the Organism not in an
Page 26 and 27: 16 Theory of the Organism formation
Page 28 and 29: 18 Theory of the Organism common sp
Page 30 and 31: 20 Theory of the Organism cated to
Page 32 and 33: 22 Theory of the Organism by these
Page 34 and 35: 24 Kant's Reading of Biology of the
Page 36 and 37: 26 Kant's Reading of Biology for in
Page 38 and 39: 28 Kant's Reading of Biology monly
Page 40 and 41: 30 Kant's Reading of Biology not be
Page 42 and 43: 32 Kant's Reading of Biology to ada
Page 44 and 45: 34 Analytic of Teleological Judgmen
Page 64 and 65: 54 Antinomies of Reason tent is par
Page 66 and 67: 56 Antinomies of Reason antinomies
Page 68 and 69: 58 Antinomies of Reason shows that
Page 70 and 71: 60 Antinomies of Reason categories
Page 72 and 73: 62 Antinomies of Reason "only condi
Page 74 and 75: 64 Antinomies of Reason described;
Page 76 and 77: 66 Kant's Logic For the true opposi
Page 78 and 79: 68 Kant's Logic outside the sphere
Page 80 and 81: 70 Kant's Logic In contrast to Lamb
Page 82 and 83: 72 Kant's Logic predicate under con
Page 84 and 85: 74 Kant's Logic other. We can thus
Page 86 and 87: 76 Kant's Logic then both conflicti
Page 88 and 89: 78 Kant's Logic Both conflicting pr
Page 90 and 91: 80 The Unconditioned and the Infini
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92 The Unconditioned and the Infini
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98 Antinomy of Division Antithesis
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100 Antinomy of Division justificat
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102 Antinomy of Division and thus p
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104 Antinomy of Division why it is
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106 Antinomy of Division B552-53) g
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108 Antinomy of Division "machine"
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110 Antinomy of Freedom How far the
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112 Antinomy of Freedom of momentum
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114 Antinomy of Freedom the Third a
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116 Antinomy of Freedom If Kant mea
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118 Antinomy of Freedom phenomena i
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120 Antinomy of Freedom In the Crit
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122 Antinomy of Freedom must appear
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124 Systematics of Antinomy I do no
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126 Summary position proves to be n
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128 Antinomy of Judgment An antinom
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130 Antinomy of Judgment §74 The r
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132 Antinomy of Judgment must have
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134 Antinomy of Judgment dialectic.
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136 Antinomy of Judgment we cannot
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138 Interpretations of the Antinomy
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152 Heuristic but Necessary Princip
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162 Resolution of the Antinomy the
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164 Resolution of the Antinomy know
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166 Resolution of the Antinomy a wh
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168 Resolution of the Antinomy able
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170 Resolution of the Antinomy ous
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172 Resolution of the Antinomy intr
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174 Resolution of the Antinomy tion
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176 Resolution of the Antinomy meth
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178 Resolution of the Antinomy anyt
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180 Summary acquainted with" a caus
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184 Bibliography Bommersheim, Paul,
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186 Bibliography Fraisse, Jean Clau
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188 Bibliography Kraemer, Eric Russ
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190 Bibliography & E. Mendelsohn) B
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192 Bibliography Roretz, Karl, "Zur
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194 Bibliography American and Conti
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196 Index 144; 154; 167; 169; final
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198 Index mere understanding 47; 13
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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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