KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

130 Antinomy of Judgment
§74 The reason why it is impossible to treat the concept of a technic
of nature dogmatically is that a natural purpose is inexplicable.
§75 The concept of an objective purposiveness of nature is a critical
principle of reason for our reflective judgment.
§76 Comment [Anmerkung].
§77 On the peculiarity of the human understanding that makes the
concept of natural purpose possible for us.
§78 How the principle of the universal mechanism of matter and the
teleological principle can be reconciled in the technic of nature.
Let it also be noted that, disregarding the "Comment" (§76), the antinomy
of judgment has exactly the same number of sections as the
antinomies chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason and a similar
structure as well, although the parallels of content are rather loose.
On the basis of the analysis of the antinomy as a figure of
argument carried out in the last chapter, we should expect the theories
of the organism actually propounded in the 18th century to be
taken into consideration in some manner by the thesis and antithesis
of the antinomy of judgment. We cannot of course expect to find a
repeat of the Leibniz-Clarke debate, since the two did not in fact
quarrel about the concept of the organism; but even the more general
expectation, that both sides of the contradiction represent positions
actually taken by significant scientists, cannot be satisfied
without reservations. We can be fairly certain that Kant's predecessors
did not consider their theories of organic phenomena to be
merely regulative principles in the sense of the Critique of Pure
Reason and that they were closer to what Kant called "constitutive
principles." The concept of natural purpose was introduced by Kant
himself, and he must take full responsibility for any internal contradictions
that should arise. If Kant intends to draw his predecessors
into the antinomy (which he obviously attempts to do in §§72-
74), he cannot introduce these positions directly as thesis and antithesis.
He must find some kind of mediating step to translate these
positions into the conceptual scheme of the Critical Philosophy.
The form in which this antinomy is resolved (as are those of
the Critique of Practical Reason and the "Critique of Aesthetic
Judgment") is the subcontrary form. It is shown that, the false presupposition
having been exposed and rejected, both thesis and antithesis
in their new forms can be true. The asymmetry in status that
could be seen between thesis and antithesis of the antinomy of
freedom will also recur in this antinomy.