KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

More documents

Recommendations

Info

36 Analytic of Teleological Judgment judgment. Its main function lies in concept and theory formation in the empirical sciences. In the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant takes up regulative principles once again, this time not as principles for the understanding but for reflective judgment. Here, he considers mainly the problems of the classification and ordering of empirical events and regularities. The point is no longer the sensible use of a traditional corpus of general principles but rather the search for regularities in the manifold of empirically given objects and events. There are numerous parallels and similarities between Kant's remarks here and those in the Appendix to the Dialectic just discussed; 27 but there is also a decisive difference in that the regulative principles for reflective judgment deal not merely with nature as such but also with particular, empirically given things. We do not merely make the transcendental presupposition that nature as a whole is purposively constructed for our cognitive activities, that it is, for instance, divided into genera and species, but rather we also consider individual objects from the point of view of their purposiveness — (subjectively) for our feelings of pleasure and displeasure in aesthetics and (objectively) for one another in the study of nature. We have just seen that Kant viewed nature as a whole as a deistic system and proposed this view as a regulative principle for empirical science. He returns to this principle as well in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment in the question of systematizing empirical regularities. We ought, he says, to consider such empirical regularities as parts of a system of laws "as if they too had been given by an understanding (even though not ours) so as to assist our cognitive powers by making possible a system of experience in terms of particular natural laws" (Bxxvii; CJ, 19). We make it a regulative principle to judge nature to be so structured that it corresponds to our needs for order. When we classify and order empirical objects, we presuppose that nature has an order. The subjective purposiveness of nature, that is, the correspondence of nature to our need for order, is a principle of reflective judgment. This harmony of nature with our cognitive power is presupposed a priori by judgment, as an aid in its reflection on nature in terms of empirical laws ... since without presupposing this harmony we would have no order of nature in terms of empirical laws, and hence nothing to guide us in using 27 Cf. Liedtke, 1964.
Analytic of Teleological Judgment 37 empirical laws so as to experience and investigate nature in its diversity. (Bxxxvi; CJ, 24-25) Besides this subjective purposiveness of nature for our faculty of knowledge, Kant also considers a purposiveness of individual objects of experience for a certain aspect of our "mind" (Gemut). Beautiful objects are purposive for our aesthetic feelings. This kind of subjective purposiveness is the object of "aesthetic judgment" and the subject matter of the first part of the Critique of Judgment. However, Kant also takes up the question of whether individual objects can be purposive not merely subjectively, i.e., for our cognitive or aesthetic faculties, but objectively, that is, purposive for other objects. He asks what it means to say that one thing is purposive for another. The meaning of the concept of an objective purposiveness is the subject of the second part of the Critique of Judgment. This concept is introduced and clarified in the "Analytic of Teleological Judgment," to which we now turn. 1.4 The Analytic of Teleological Judgment In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment" Kant undertakes a systematic analysis of the limits of mechanistic explanation and the legitimacy of teleological principles in natural science. His goal is to determine to what extent and under what conditions the purposive character of things, relationships, and processes can itself have some explanatory value, that is, may legitimately be used in scientific explanation. Furthermore, he seeks to determine when and whether one can or should introduce teleological assumptions as a heuristic device to reveal traces of the hidden pathways of mechanism. But the most important question he deals with concerns the seeming necessity of using a heuristic teleology in the explanation of organisms. It is of course clear that the teleological assumptions are merely regulative. If the object studied is conceived as natural, it is precluded that its purposiveness is due to a purposefully acting subject or that real intentions are involved. However, we are also not dealing with the merely subjective purposiveness of nature or of individual natural objects for our faculty of knowledge or our
Page 1: KANT’S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN B
Page 5 and 6: Contents Acknowledgments...........
Page 7 and 8: Acknowledgements vii This book pres
Page 9: To My Parents M.M.M. and P.O.M.
Page 12 and 13: 2 Introduction fact the rejection o
Page 14 and 15: 4 Introduction almost exclusively c
Page 16 and 17: 6 Introduction reductionism as the
Page 18 and 19: 8 Theory of the Organism will be se
Page 20 and 21: 10 Theory of the Organism when he f
Page 22 and 23: 12 Theory of the Organism that this
Page 24 and 25: 14 Theory of the Organism not in an
Page 26 and 27: 16 Theory of the Organism formation
Page 28 and 29: 18 Theory of the Organism common sp
Page 30 and 31: 20 Theory of the Organism cated to
Page 32 and 33: 22 Theory of the Organism by these
Page 34 and 35: 24 Kant's Reading of Biology of the
Page 36 and 37: 26 Kant's Reading of Biology for in
Page 38 and 39: 28 Kant's Reading of Biology monly
Page 40 and 41: 30 Kant's Reading of Biology not be
Page 42 and 43: 32 Kant's Reading of Biology to ada
Page 44 and 45: 34 Analytic of Teleological Judgmen
Page 64 and 65: 54 Antinomies of Reason tent is par
Page 66 and 67: 56 Antinomies of Reason antinomies
Page 68 and 69: 58 Antinomies of Reason shows that
Page 70 and 71: 60 Antinomies of Reason categories
Page 72 and 73: 62 Antinomies of Reason "only condi
Page 74 and 75: 64 Antinomies of Reason described;
Page 76 and 77: 66 Kant's Logic For the true opposi
Page 78 and 79: 68 Kant's Logic outside the sphere
Page 80 and 81: 70 Kant's Logic In contrast to Lamb
Page 82 and 83: 72 Kant's Logic predicate under con
Page 84 and 85: 74 Kant's Logic other. We can thus
Page 86 and 87: 76 Kant's Logic then both conflicti
Page 88 and 89: 78 Kant's Logic Both conflicting pr
Page 90 and 91: 80 The Unconditioned and the Infini
Page 96 and 97:
86 The Unconditioned and the Infini
Page 98 and 99:
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
Page 108 and 109:
98 Antinomy of Division Antithesis
Page 110 and 111:
100 Antinomy of Division justificat
Page 112 and 113:
102 Antinomy of Division and thus p
Page 114 and 115:
104 Antinomy of Division why it is
Page 116 and 117:
106 Antinomy of Division B552-53) g
Page 118 and 119:
108 Antinomy of Division "machine"
Page 120 and 121:
110 Antinomy of Freedom How far the
Page 122 and 123:
112 Antinomy of Freedom of momentum
Page 124 and 125:
114 Antinomy of Freedom the Third a
Page 126 and 127:
116 Antinomy of Freedom If Kant mea
Page 128 and 129:
118 Antinomy of Freedom phenomena i
Page 130 and 131:
120 Antinomy of Freedom In the Crit
Page 132 and 133:
122 Antinomy of Freedom must appear
Page 134 and 135:
124 Systematics of Antinomy I do no
Page 136 and 137:
126 Summary position proves to be n
Page 138 and 139:
128 Antinomy of Judgment An antinom
Page 140 and 141:
130 Antinomy of Judgment §74 The r
Page 142 and 143:
132 Antinomy of Judgment must have
Page 144 and 145:
134 Antinomy of Judgment dialectic.
Page 146 and 147:
136 Antinomy of Judgment we cannot
Page 148 and 149:
138 Interpretations of the Antinomy
Page 150 and 151:
Page 152 and 153:
Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
152 Heuristic but Necessary Princip
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
162 Resolution of the Antinomy the
Page 174 and 175:
164 Resolution of the Antinomy know
Page 176 and 177:
166 Resolution of the Antinomy a wh
Page 178 and 179:
168 Resolution of the Antinomy able
Page 180 and 181:
170 Resolution of the Antinomy ous
Page 182 and 183:
172 Resolution of the Antinomy intr
Page 184 and 185:
174 Resolution of the Antinomy tion
Page 186 and 187:
176 Resolution of the Antinomy meth
Page 188 and 189:
178 Resolution of the Antinomy anyt
Page 190:
180 Summary acquainted with" a caus
Page 194 and 195:
184 Bibliography Bommersheim, Paul,
Page 196 and 197:
186 Bibliography Fraisse, Jean Clau
Page 198 and 199:
188 Bibliography Kraemer, Eric Russ
Page 200 and 201:
190 Bibliography & E. Mendelsohn) B
Page 202 and 203:
192 Bibliography Roretz, Karl, "Zur
Page 204 and 205:
194 Bibliography American and Conti
Page 206 and 207:
196 Index 144; 154; 167; 169; final
Page 208 and 209:
198 Index mere understanding 47; 13
show all

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?