KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Presentation of the Antinomy 133
sionally be necessary on points of fundamental importance to insist
literally on Kant's exact wording — against the entire tradition of
interpretation. In Section 3.3 the most important varieties of interpretation
of the antinomy itself will be examined systematically.
Differences in the interpretation of other passages will occasionally
also be taken up, but there will be no explicit discussion of the spectrum
of interpretations on these points, since such differences are
in principle merely consequences of the fundamental differences in
the interpretation of the antinomy itself. The interpretation of this
point is what is decisive.
In Section 3.4 I shall examine Kant's focusing of the opposition
and his discussion of his predecessors (§§72-76) Section 3.5 will
present the resolution of the antinomy (§77) and the subsequent
reconciliation of mechanism and teleology (§78). Section 3.6 will
recapitulate the argument.
3.2 Presentation of the antinomy (§§69-71)
Determinate judgment, according to Kant, cannot run into
contradiction with itself since it does not give itself any laws; it subsumes
particulars under concepts given it by the understanding,
and if some conflict should arise between concepts, it is the understanding
itself that is responsible. Reflective judgment on the other
hand must subsume a given object under empirical laws which it
must itself first find. It is its own legislator to the extent that it gives
itself rules about how to find these laws. It is thus at least conceivable
that it could find itself compelled to give itself different maxims
for action that actually come into conflict with one another. Whereas
determinate judgment might possibly be obliged to accept contradictory
principles (which might constitute an antinomy but only an
antinomy of the faculty mandating the principles), reflective judgement
can run into difficulties with its own proprietary principles.
That is, an antinomy specific to judgment, should one arise, can
arise only with respect to reflective judgment. At least, it is possible
in principle for an apparent contradiction between two maxims of
reflective judgment to arise.
Now between these necessary maxims of reflective judgment a conflict may
arise, and hence an antinomy; and this antinomy forms the basis for a