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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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Introduction 57<br />

I shall restrict myself to examining just a few essential points. 3 The<br />

recognition that the position of the thesis is cum grano salis that of<br />

Newton and that the antithesis position is generally that of Leibniz<br />

is itself basically a historical triviality confirmed by any serious<br />

study of the history of science. I take it up here only because much<br />

recent philosophical discussion ignores this simple fact.<br />

W.H. Walsh 4 points out that most English language commentators<br />

up to now have maintained just the opposite attributions (i.e.,<br />

they associate Leibniz with the theses and Newton with the antitheses);<br />

and he further indicates that the reason for this lies in the<br />

fact that Kant himself characterizes the thesis position as<br />

"Platonism" and the antithesis position as "Empiricism." Al Azm<br />

cites T.D. Weldon as a chief exponent of this kind of interpretation;<br />

Weldon asserts: 5<br />

It is immediately clear that Kant considers the theses to be the a priori<br />

contentions of rationalist cosmology, while the antitheses represent the<br />

empiricist attack on it, and also that the truth of the theses rather than that of<br />

the antitheses is desirable both on practical and speculative grounds. For the<br />

theses, in so far as they are true, involve the existence both of God and of a<br />

moral capacity in man, both of which are by implication denied by the<br />

antitheses ...<br />

As Al Azm correctly remarks, this is far from "immediately<br />

clear." As a matter of fact, the only reason for the immediately obvious<br />

nature of this interpretation lies in the fact that Kant has called<br />

the Antithesis position "Empiricism" (B496). However, Kant's<br />

name-giving of course changes nothing in the rationalist content of<br />

the position as laid out in the discussions of the antitheses and only<br />

3 Cf. Al Azm, Origins, and Martin, Kant, pp. 48-58. This insight seems to be<br />

gaining acceptance: cf. Walsh, Criticism, p. 198; Wilkerson, Critique, p. 117;<br />

Allison, Transcendental Idealism, p. 38; even Bennett (Dialectics, pp. 7 and 119)<br />

who does not seem to understand the significance of the connection, does not deny<br />

the historical accuracy of the attributions. Unfortunately, when Al Azm rejects<br />

Strawson's philosophical objections to Kant's arguments as "historically<br />

irrelevant," he allows the impression to arise that he accepts the philosophical<br />

content of the objections as correct.<br />

4 Walsh, Criticism, p. 198.<br />

5 Al Azm, Origins, 3; Weldon, Kant's Critique, pp. 204-5. It is clear from the<br />

language used that Weldon at least is referring to the passage cited by Walsh (i.e.<br />

B494-500). Furthermore, Weldon's misinterpretation, that Kant considers the<br />

thesis to be preferable on speculative grounds, can only be traced to this passage,<br />

where Kant in fact asserts a speculative interest of reason in the thesis position;<br />

however two pages later, Kant informs us that the advantages of the antithesis in<br />

this regard "far exceed" those of the thesis (B496).

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