KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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28 Kant's Reading of Biology monly done" (W 1,681; Ak 2,115). Moreover, he passes over in silence the question of whether the supernatural can legitimately be appealed to at all in a natural scientific explanation. Kant is in fundamental agreement with the epigenetic alternative to the preformation theory, but he criticizes the particular articulation that this alternative received in the works of Buffon and Maupertuis: The inner forms of Mr. de Buffon and the elements of organic matter, which in the opinion of Mr. de Maupertuis arrange themselves in consequence of their memories and according to the laws of desire and aversion, are either as incomprehensible as the thing itself or completely arbitrarily adduced. (W 1,680; Ak 2,115) Particular such theories may be wrong, but the kind of theory is in principle correct since it attempts to explain at least present generation scientifically instead of tracing it back to an immediate divine action. In spite of all difficulties in actually providing an explanation, Kant modestly pleads for the attempt. However, Kant does not develop any theory of the organism in this work, and many remarks simply repeat the positions of the theory of the heavens (e.g., W 1,708, 1,725; Ak 2,139, 2,152). Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the perspective under which the organism is being considered in this book is the question of whether or not it contributes to a proof of the existence of God. Thus, we can expect no "theory" of the organism. Nonetheless, it is in any case obvious that Kant has begun to see difficulties of principle in a mechanistic explanation of the organism. He has apparently had serious second thoughts about mechanistic views, but he has not been able to come to an even provisional conclusion. He considers the laws of nature to be insufficient to explain the production of an organism, and he appears to ground his doubts not merely in the organism's quantitative complexity. However, the conceptual determination of what it is that distinguishes the organism from other things is not very convincing; Kant mentions wonder: 21 "And even if I could examine all the springs and tubes, all nerve fibers, levers and mechanical contraptions of such a thing, nonetheless, the wonder would remain" (W 1,725; Ak 2,152). This wonder at the adaptations of the parts to particular purposes indicates the problem, without however providing a conceptual handle for dealing with it. 21 Kant returns to this concept in the CJ (§62); cf. B275-7; CJ, 242-3.
The Origin of Human Races Human Races 29 Kant's only extensive or systematic reflections about basic questions of biology in the time between the Proof of the Existence of God and the Critique of Judgment are to be found in a series of three papers on human races that Kant published in connection with his university lectures on physical geography. 22 Although these essays deal primarily with the question of the common origin of all humans and with empirical criteria for classifying races, some fundamental questions on the nature of organization are also touched on. In particular, the question of the purposiveness of organs and structures is taken up. Kant examines the ability of organisms to adapt themselves to conditions of their environment and to pass on these adaptations unchanged to their descendants — independently of the further existence of the environmental conditions. 23 The concept of race, which Kant adopted from Buffon was new in natural history and referred to new problems. With the establishment of Buffon's criterion for species boundaries (the sterility of species hybrids) the problem arose that there were also fertile hybrids or half-breeds. That is, there existed clearly distinct varieties which passed on unchanged their characters and perhaps would have been considered separate species if the individuals had 22 "The Different Races of Men," (1775) W 6,7-30; Ak 2,427-443; "Determination of the Concept of a Race of Men," (1785) W 6,63-82; Ak 8,89-106; and "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy," (1788) W 5,137-170; Ak 8,157-184. 23 The belief in the inheritance of acquired characters was quite common in the 18th century; and before Lamarck no distinction in principle was made between passively acquired mutilations and actively acquired adaptations. Kant was in fact one of the first serious critics of the possibility in principle of such inheritance. Blumenbach, for instance, though skeptical whether mutilations could be inherited, considered it to be a purely empirical question. In the second paper on race Kant wrote (in Lovejoy's translation): "Now it is clear that if some magical power of the imagination, or the artifice of men, were capable of modifying in the bodies of animals the reproductive faculty itself, of transforming Nature's original model or of making additions to it, which changes should then become permanent in subsequent generations, we should no longer know from what original Nature had begun, nor how far the alteration of that original may proceed, nor — since man's imagination knows no bounds — into what grotesqueries of form species might eventually be transmorgrified." (W 6,72; Ak 8,97; Lovejoy, p.184)
Page 1: KANT’S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN B
Page 5 and 6: Contents Acknowledgments...........
Page 7 and 8: Acknowledgements vii This book pres
Page 9: To My Parents M.M.M. and P.O.M.
Page 12 and 13: 2 Introduction fact the rejection o
Page 14 and 15: 4 Introduction almost exclusively c
Page 16 and 17: 6 Introduction reductionism as the
Page 18 and 19: 8 Theory of the Organism will be se
Page 20 and 21: 10 Theory of the Organism when he f
Page 22 and 23: 12 Theory of the Organism that this
Page 24 and 25: 14 Theory of the Organism not in an
Page 26 and 27: 16 Theory of the Organism formation
Page 28 and 29: 18 Theory of the Organism common sp
Page 30 and 31: 20 Theory of the Organism cated to
Page 32 and 33: 22 Theory of the Organism by these
Page 34 and 35: 24 Kant's Reading of Biology of the
Page 36 and 37: 26 Kant's Reading of Biology for in
Page 40 and 41: 30 Kant's Reading of Biology not be
Page 42 and 43: 32 Kant's Reading of Biology to ada
Page 44 and 45: 34 Analytic of Teleological Judgmen
Page 64 and 65: 54 Antinomies of Reason tent is par
Page 66 and 67: 56 Antinomies of Reason antinomies
Page 68 and 69: 58 Antinomies of Reason shows that
Page 70 and 71: 60 Antinomies of Reason categories
Page 72 and 73: 62 Antinomies of Reason "only condi
Page 74 and 75: 64 Antinomies of Reason described;
Page 76 and 77: 66 Kant's Logic For the true opposi
Page 78 and 79: 68 Kant's Logic outside the sphere
Page 80 and 81: 70 Kant's Logic In contrast to Lamb
Page 82 and 83: 72 Kant's Logic predicate under con
Page 84 and 85: 74 Kant's Logic other. We can thus
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78 Kant's Logic Both conflicting pr
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80 The Unconditioned and the Infini
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98 Antinomy of Division Antithesis
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100 Antinomy of Division justificat
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102 Antinomy of Division and thus p
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104 Antinomy of Division why it is
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106 Antinomy of Division B552-53) g
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108 Antinomy of Division "machine"
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110 Antinomy of Freedom How far the
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112 Antinomy of Freedom of momentum
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114 Antinomy of Freedom the Third a
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116 Antinomy of Freedom If Kant mea
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118 Antinomy of Freedom phenomena i
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120 Antinomy of Freedom In the Crit
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122 Antinomy of Freedom must appear
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124 Systematics of Antinomy I do no
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126 Summary position proves to be n
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128 Antinomy of Judgment An antinom
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130 Antinomy of Judgment §74 The r
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132 Antinomy of Judgment must have
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134 Antinomy of Judgment dialectic.
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136 Antinomy of Judgment we cannot
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138 Interpretations of the Antinomy
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152 Heuristic but Necessary Princip
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162 Resolution of the Antinomy the
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164 Resolution of the Antinomy know
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166 Resolution of the Antinomy a wh
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168 Resolution of the Antinomy able
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170 Resolution of the Antinomy ous
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172 Resolution of the Antinomy intr
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174 Resolution of the Antinomy tion
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176 Resolution of the Antinomy meth
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178 Resolution of the Antinomy anyt
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180 Summary acquainted with" a caus
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184 Bibliography Bommersheim, Paul,
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186 Bibliography Fraisse, Jean Clau
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188 Bibliography Kraemer, Eric Russ
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190 Bibliography & E. Mendelsohn) B
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192 Bibliography Roretz, Karl, "Zur
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194 Bibliography American and Conti
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196 Index 144; 154; 167; 169; final
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198 Index mere understanding 47; 13
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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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