KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Presentation of the Antinomy 135
nomy is not just the "critical" reflection of a really given historical
conflict. Kant proceeds (note the subjunctive):
These maxims are regulative principles for our investigation [of nature]. If
we converted them into constitutive principles concerning the possibility of
the objects themselves, they would read:
[C1] Thesis: All production of material things is possible in terms of
merely mechanical laws.
[C2] Antithesis: Some production of material things is not possible in terms
of merely mechanical laws. (B314-5; CJ, 267)
Kant points out that this second pair of opposites, should one
propose it, would present a conflict and could result in an antinomy
— not an antinomy of judgment, but rather a "conflict within the
legislation of reason." (B315; CJ, 267) These principles would not be
such as judgment gives itself but rather principles forced upon it
from without. This second pair of opposites (C1 and C2), which does
in fact reflect two basic positions of 18th century thought on the
nature of the organism, does not constitute an antinomy — neither
an antinomy of judgment nor one of the understanding or reason —
since neither of them is in any sense necessary. As Kant says:
"Reason, however, cannot prove either of these two principles."
(B315; CJ, 267) Moreover, even if we were to assume that the propositions
could be proven, they would still not constitute an antinomy
of judgment and Kant proceeds to admonish us not to confuse the
two pairs of conflicting propositions.
It should also be pointed out that the second maxim of the
antinomy (R2) consists of two complete propositions, of which only
the first contradicts the first maxim (R1). However, only the second
part of (R2) (which Kant put in parentheses) deals with teleology or
final causes. Thus, the apparent contradiction or the antinomy itself
subsists not between a mechanistic and a teleological principle but
between two different propositions about mechanism, between the
general necessity and the occasional impossibility of purely mechanistic
judgment: everything must be judged mechanistically, some
things cannot be so judged. It is thus, strictly speaking, incorrect to
speak of an antinomy between mechanism and teleology or between
mechanistic and teleological principles, since no logical incompatibility
between them is asserted by these propositions. Only after the
occasional impossibility of merely mechanistic explanation has been
established does the second part of the second maxim (on final
causes) apply at all. Only when it is clear that there exist things that