KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Systematic Locus 81
ture and function of this kind of argumentational figure for later
reference. That the positions of the thesis and the antithesis reflect
real foundational problems of modern natural science, has already
been made clear in the discussion of the Leibniz-Clarke debate. I
shall here simply assume for better or worse that they can also be
'derived' in some manner from Kantian systematics.
The three major areas of interest of the Dialectic are traced
back to the three different forms of logical inference: categorical,
hypothetical, and disjunctive (B360-1 and B379-80). From these three
forms of inference Kant derives three "ideas of reason" (analogous
to the forms of judgment and concepts of the understanding) and
reasons from the logical to the transcendental (in analogy to the
analysis of the understanding). The transcendental concepts of
reason (ideas) can also be used transcendently, i.e. illegitimately, if
the understanding attempts to follow them beyond the bounds of
possible experience. The Dialectic or the critique of the illusions
which occur thereupon is divided into two books, "the first on the
transcendent concepts of pure reason, the second on its transcendent
and dialectical inferences" (B366).
In accordance with the three relations of inferences to their
conditions, there are three transcendental ideas which denote the
subject matter of three areas of metaphysics: the subject matter of
psychology (the ego as a simple substance, the soul, immortality);
the subject matter of cosmology (the world, freedom); and the subject
of theology (God). The ascription of objective reality to these ideas is a
"dialectical inference" (B397-8). The antinomies chapter deals with
the second area, the world (and freedom). "The second kind of
pseudo-rational inference is directed to the transcendental concept
of absolute totality of the series of conditions for any given appearance
... The position of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall
entitle the antinomy of pure reason." (B398)
Like the other inferences of reason the antinomies are due to
reason's demand for the unconditioned, for absolute totality of the
conditions. In the antinomies in particular the problem is the absolute
completion of the series of conditions belonging to a given conditioned
phenomenon.
Reason makes this demand in accordance with the principle that if the
conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the
absolutely unconditioned (through which alone the conditioned has been
possible) is also given. (B436 emphasis, Kant)