KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

136 Antinomy of Judgment
we cannot explain mechanistically need we take refuge in teleology.
The maxim of teleology proper ("Judging them requires a quite different
causal law — viz., that of final causes") is introduced only if
the first part of (R2) is true; and furthermore, it can only then potentially
lead to difficulties if (R1) is also true. Thus a conflict between
mechanism and teleology can only then arise when both apparently
contradictory propositions about mechanism are true, that is, after
the antinomy proper has already been resolved in a "subcontrary"
manner. The resolution of the apparent contradiction must show
that both maxims of mechanism can in some intelligible sense be
said to be true. After the resolution of the antinomy proper, the occasional
use of teleology must then be reconciled with what is left of
mechanism. The first task is completed by Kant in the second to the
last section, §77; the second task in the last section, §78. It is essential
for an understanding of the Kantian text to remember that we
are dealing with three propositions (two on mechanical laws and
one on final causes) and with two different oppositions. The two
propositions about mechanism contradict one another; their relation
to the proposition about final causes has still to be clarified.
Kant's presentation of the antinomy in §70 takes these three
elements and their particular relations into account. Before he cites
the maxims themselves, he examines their origins. He stipulates:
that judgment presupposes two maxims as it reflects: one of these the mere
understanding gives it a priori; the other is prompted by special
experiences, experiences that bring reason into play so that we may judge ...
in terms of a special principle. (B314; CJ, *267; emphasis PM)
Mere understanding says "everything must"; special experience
says "some things cannot"; and then reason comes into play and in
turn introduces final causes. Three elements are mentioned: 1)
understanding a priori, 2) empirical understanding or experience,
and 3) reason. At this point in the analysis it is difficult to explain
what exactly these distinctions are supposed to mean. However, it
can at least be pointed out that we have already encountered a similar
distinction between understanding and reason in the "derivation"
of the concept of natural purpose in §65. There, the "mere
understanding" prescribed a particular kind of causal connection; a
special experience compelled the understanding to introduce final