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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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106 Antinomy of Division<br />

B552-53) gives adequate occasion for confusion. Some examples may<br />

be given here (emphasis PM):<br />

A1) For this matter is given as a whole, and therefore with all its possible<br />

parts, in empirical intuition ... the further members of any continued division<br />

are themselves empirically given prior to the continuation of the<br />

division.. (B541)<br />

A2) there are always more members, empirically given, than I reach<br />

through the regress of decomposition; (B*542)<br />

A3) For the conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the conditioned,<br />

and since this is given complete in an intuition that is enclosed<br />

between limits, the parts are one and all given together with the conditioned.<br />

(B551-2)<br />

B1) In neither case, whether the regress be in infinitum of in indefinitum,<br />

may the series of conditions be regarded as being given as infinite in the<br />

object. (B542)<br />

B2) [A body] is therefore infinitely divisible, without consisting, however,<br />

of infinitely many parts. (B553)<br />

B3) only the divisibility, i.e. an in itself absolutely indeterminate number<br />

[Menge] of parts is given — the parts themselves being given and determined<br />

only through the subdivision; in short, the whole is not in itself<br />

already divided. (B*554)<br />

B4) For these [the phenomena] are mere representations; and the parts<br />

exist merely in their representation, consequently in the division (i.e., in a<br />

possible experience where they are given) and the division reaches only as<br />

far as such experience reaches. (Prolegomena, §52c, 83; A149)<br />

B5) For the parts insofar as they belong to the existence of an appearance<br />

exist only in thought, namely in the division itself. (Metaphysical Foundations,<br />

54; A50)<br />

Although it is correct that the B-opinion is expressed more<br />

often than the A-opinion, nonetheless we are dealing here not with<br />

an opinion poll but with expressions of one and the same person to a<br />

large extent within the course of ten pages. There are even more<br />

such remarks, which are simply too long to be quoted conveniently.<br />

However it is possible to interpret Kant in such a way that he is not<br />

engaged in wild fluctuations between contradictory positions and<br />

also without simply certifying a qualified majority of votes for the<br />

B-opinion.<br />

It is quite clear on the basis of the resolution section of the<br />

antinomies chapter as well as from Kant's later writings, that he<br />

holds that not all the parts or the conditions are necessarily given as<br />

discrete entities before the regressive synthesis of division. It is also<br />

clear that the division itself cannot be the condition of the parts, i.e.,<br />

that division is not a real ground (Realgrund) but only a cognitive

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