KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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44 Analytic of Teleological Judgment any reference to the trees. We have no justification for the assumption that the existence of spruce trees was a purpose of nature, and that this purpose explains why the seas receded, leaving the sand behind. Judging a phenomenon as relatively purposive is thus never necessary in order to explain its origin, but the fact that is can sometimes be meaningful to ascribe this kind of purposiveness to a phenomenon gives an "indication" of a different kind of purposiveness which Kant denotes with the term "natural purpose." Not every thing is so constituted that other things can be purposive for it; e.g., the sandy soil is purposive for (beneficial to) the spruce trees; however the receding of the sea is not purposive for (beneficial to) the soil, but only by way of the soil for the trees. As Kant summarizes: We can easily see from this that extrinsic purposiveness (a thing's being beneficial to others) can be regarded as an extrinsic natural purpose only under the condition that the existence of what it benefits proximately or remotely is a purpose of nature in its own right. This, however, we can never tell by merely examining nature; and hence it follows that, although relative purposiveness points hypothetically to natural purposes, it does not justify any absolute teleological judgment. (B282-3; CJ, 246) Natural Purpose In cases of relative or extrinsic purposiveness, the thing considered purposive was in principle as a relative purpose explainable according to purely mechanical laws. With intrinsic purposiveness this is no longer the case. Here we are dealing with things whose form cannot be explained according to mechanical laws; the "contingency" of such things, i.e. their underdetermination by empirical laws of nature, compels us to assume an additional causality according to concepts. An object for whose origin we must assume "the ability to act according to purposes (i.e. a will)" can only be conceived to be possible as a purpose (B285; CJ, 248). For artifacts this occasions no difficulties: without the artisan and his idea or concept of what he wants to produce, an artifact would appear to be most accidental and clearly underdetermined by empirical laws. Kant uses the example of a regular hexagon found sketched in the sand: Although it is not completely impossible that such a figure could have been made on the deserted beach by the wind or the sea or by the footprints of animals without intent, we
Natural Purpose 45 can scarcely imagine it otherwise than as a purpose, i.e. a realized concept ("vestigium hominis video"). Here we assume an actual causality according to a concept and look for the agent (whom Kant consistently reduces to an understanding) who realized in sand the concept of hexagon. In this example we are clearly dealing with the idea of the product, not with the idea of the effects of the product that motivate its production. The motives and intentions of the artist — perhaps his anticipation of the surprise of the philosopher on discovering the hexagon — play no role in this analysis. It will be worthwhile, especially with regard to the structure of biological explanation to examine closely the difference between the intellectual anticipation of the artifact itself (causa formalis) and the intellectual anticipation of the effects or consequences of that artifact (causa finalis). Both can be subsumed under the concept of "teleology", although only the causa finalis is commonly designated as "purpose." In Kant just the reverse seems to be the case. At any rate it is essential in the analysis of Kant's text to ask what kind of teleology and what kind of purposes he means. We have already seen that the causa formalis was an essential component of the deistic systems of the world, but that these systems denied the causa finalis any role in physical explanation. In these systems teleology consisted in a clockmaker God, assumed to be real, so that the entire world system was considered to be a divine artifact. If Kant is in fact restricting himself to the causa formalis, then he is not introducing any kind of teleology that was not already part of deistic science. After introducing the example above to illustrate purpose, i.e., the causality of a concept, Kant poses the question whether there can also be things, which, like artifacts, can only be conceived as purposes but which are not artifacts but rather pure products of nature. Such things, which, like artifacts, are supposed to have an intrinsic purposiveness, Kant calls natural purposes ("Naturzwecke") and attempts to explicate this concept and to determine the difference to an artifact: On the other hand, in order to judge something, which we cognize as a natural product, to be a purpose, and hence a natural purpose, then — unless perhaps a contradiction lies in the very thought — we need more than this. (B*286; CJ, 249) I shall go into some detail on Kant's analysis of this concept since it is the pivotal concept of his entire discussion of mechanistic explanation in biology and is the source of the "antinomy" resolved
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KANT’S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN B
Page 5 and 6: Contents Acknowledgments...........
Page 7 and 8: Acknowledgements vii This book pres
Page 9: To My Parents M.M.M. and P.O.M.
Page 12 and 13: 2 Introduction fact the rejection o
Page 14 and 15: 4 Introduction almost exclusively c
Page 16 and 17: 6 Introduction reductionism as the
Page 18 and 19: 8 Theory of the Organism will be se
Page 20 and 21: 10 Theory of the Organism when he f
Page 22 and 23: 12 Theory of the Organism that this
Page 24 and 25: 14 Theory of the Organism not in an
Page 26 and 27: 16 Theory of the Organism formation
Page 28 and 29: 18 Theory of the Organism common sp
Page 30 and 31: 20 Theory of the Organism cated to
Page 32 and 33: 22 Theory of the Organism by these
Page 34 and 35: 24 Kant's Reading of Biology of the
Page 36 and 37: 26 Kant's Reading of Biology for in
Page 38 and 39: 28 Kant's Reading of Biology monly
Page 40 and 41: 30 Kant's Reading of Biology not be
Page 42 and 43: 32 Kant's Reading of Biology to ada
Page 44 and 45: 34 Analytic of Teleological Judgmen
Page 64 and 65: 54 Antinomies of Reason tent is par
Page 66 and 67: 56 Antinomies of Reason antinomies
Page 68 and 69: 58 Antinomies of Reason shows that
Page 70 and 71: 60 Antinomies of Reason categories
Page 72 and 73: 62 Antinomies of Reason "only condi
Page 74 and 75: 64 Antinomies of Reason described;
Page 76 and 77: 66 Kant's Logic For the true opposi
Page 78 and 79: 68 Kant's Logic outside the sphere
Page 80 and 81: 70 Kant's Logic In contrast to Lamb
Page 82 and 83: 72 Kant's Logic predicate under con
Page 84 and 85: 74 Kant's Logic other. We can thus
Page 86 and 87: 76 Kant's Logic then both conflicti
Page 88 and 89: 78 Kant's Logic Both conflicting pr
Page 90 and 91: 80 The Unconditioned and the Infini
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94 The Unconditioned and the Infini
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96 The Unconditioned and the Infini
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98 Antinomy of Division Antithesis
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100 Antinomy of Division justificat
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102 Antinomy of Division and thus p
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104 Antinomy of Division why it is
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106 Antinomy of Division B552-53) g
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108 Antinomy of Division "machine"
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110 Antinomy of Freedom How far the
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112 Antinomy of Freedom of momentum
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114 Antinomy of Freedom the Third a
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116 Antinomy of Freedom If Kant mea
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118 Antinomy of Freedom phenomena i
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120 Antinomy of Freedom In the Crit
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122 Antinomy of Freedom must appear
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124 Systematics of Antinomy I do no
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126 Summary position proves to be n
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128 Antinomy of Judgment An antinom
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130 Antinomy of Judgment §74 The r
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132 Antinomy of Judgment must have
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134 Antinomy of Judgment dialectic.
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136 Antinomy of Judgment we cannot
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138 Interpretations of the Antinomy
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152 Heuristic but Necessary Princip
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162 Resolution of the Antinomy the
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164 Resolution of the Antinomy know
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166 Resolution of the Antinomy a wh
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168 Resolution of the Antinomy able
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170 Resolution of the Antinomy ous
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172 Resolution of the Antinomy intr
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174 Resolution of the Antinomy tion
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176 Resolution of the Antinomy meth
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178 Resolution of the Antinomy anyt
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180 Summary acquainted with" a caus
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184 Bibliography Bommersheim, Paul,
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186 Bibliography Fraisse, Jean Clau
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188 Bibliography Kraemer, Eric Russ
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190 Bibliography & E. Mendelsohn) B
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192 Bibliography Roretz, Karl, "Zur
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194 Bibliography American and Conti
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196 Index 144; 154; 167; 169; final
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198 Index mere understanding 47; 13
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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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