KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

Mechanism 155
Pure Reason (1781); it occurs occasionally but only in the sense of
"machine" or "system." 24 In the presentation of the antinomy of
freedom, for instance, it is not used at all. The terms "mechanism"
and "causality" are neither equated nor distinguished. Kant introduced
the equation in later writings and used it systematically. In
the new preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason
(1787) Kant recapitulates the Third Antinomy as an opposition
between freedom and the "mechanism of nature" (Bxxvii-xxx). And
in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) he almost always says
"mechanism" when he means natural causality. Thus, it could be
objected, if we want to see a development in Kant's thought during
the 1780's, then this development is towards a systematic identification
of mechanism and causality and not towards their differentiation.
Such an objection presupposes a particular conception of conceptual
development that is not unassailable. It is assumed that
conceptual development is continuous and cumulative. One can just
as well maintain that only the equation (and thus comparison) of the
two concepts mechanism and causality makes it possible to differentiate
between them; it is only the synonymous usage of the terms in
a particular context, where they turn out to be incompatible, that
makes their differentiation necessary. My interpretation of the conceptual
development is thus that it was only the attempt to extend
causal explanation in its reductionistic form to the explanation of
the organism, that forced Kant to acknowledge that he had ascribed
as self-evident a determination to causality that cannot be derived
analytically from the concept of cause. It is significant that in those
cases in which Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (B version) and
in the Critique of Practical Reason equates causality and mechanism
— in the antinomy of freedom — the relation of part and whole
plays no relevant role. But for the concept of natural purpose and
consequently for the antinomy of judgment, this relation is decisive.
In conclusion, it can be seen that the interpretation of the
Critique of Judgment, demanded by considerations of content, can
indeed be reconciled with Kant's other writings. The distinction between
mechanism and causality is necessary to make sense of the
Dialectic of teleological judgment, and it can conceived as a rational
development of Kantian positions. Finally, it now becomes clear,
24 Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A66, A696, A697, A691.