KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
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74 Kant's Logic<br />
other. We can thus say that while it is true that the soul is not blue,<br />
it is false to say that it is non-blue, just as it is false that it is blue.<br />
However, membership or lack of membership in the appropriate<br />
genus is obviously not always analytic in a given conceptual system.<br />
When membership in the genus is a synthetic predicate or contingent<br />
property, then the situation becomes somewhat more complicated:<br />
and just such a case occurs in the antinomies.<br />
In various reflections and lectures (at least according to the<br />
notes his students took) Kant provided a number of mutually incompatible<br />
explanations of the nature of infinite judgments. Thus, it is<br />
probably impossible to give an interpretation that will make all his<br />
recorded remarks on the subject consistent. However, the problem<br />
that Kant is dealing with on all these occasions is the same: the<br />
principium exclusi medii, the Law of the Excluded Middle. 33 The<br />
common denominator of all Kant's inconsistent remarks on infinite<br />
judgments is that the Law of the Excluded Middle does not automatically<br />
apply to the conjunction of an affirmative and an infinite<br />
judgment as it does to the conjunction of an affirmative and a negative<br />
judgment.<br />
Tertium datur<br />
Nowhere in the Critique of Pure Reason does Kant say that<br />
infinite judgments play a significant role in dialectical illusion.<br />
However, the paradigmatic example used to illustrate the logical<br />
structure of the antinomies does in fact involve just such a<br />
33 Cf. e.g. the following two explanations taken from the lecture notes of Kant's<br />
students (which represent perhaps not so much what Kant said as what the students<br />
understood him to have meant):<br />
"In infinite judgments I imagine that the subject is contained in a different<br />
sphere than that of the predicate. For example, anima est non-mortalis; here, I<br />
imagine that the soul does not belong to the mortals, but I think still more, namely,<br />
that it belongs to the immortals, I imagine it in a different sphere as contained in<br />
the concept." (Ak 24,578; hyphen added)<br />
"But if I say: anima est non-mortalis: then I say not merely that the soul contains<br />
nothing mortal, but, moreover, that it is also contained in the sphere of everything<br />
that is not mortal ... I do not actually say est immortalis, but rather I say: that<br />
among all concepts in general which might be conceived outside the concept of<br />
mortality the soul can be found. And this actually constitutes the infinite<br />
judgment." (Ak 24,940; hyphen added). Cf. also Ak 16, 635-641.