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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

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156 Heuristic but Necessary Principles<br />

how the antinomy of judgment can be conceived as an apparent contradiction<br />

within Kant's critical philosophy. This distinction forces<br />

Kant to reconsider the seemingly self-evident character of the presuppositions<br />

underlying the Second Antinomy in the Critique of<br />

Pure Reason.<br />

Necessary Maxims<br />

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant had shown how differing<br />

interests of reason could lead to conflicting demands on the understanding;<br />

but so long as they are only regulative principles, there is<br />

no genuine opposition. The regulative ideas of reason introduced in<br />

the Critique of Pure Reason applied to phenomena in general: one<br />

ought, for instance, to collect species into genera and divide genera<br />

into species. These were general heuristic principles to be applied at<br />

different times for different purposes. In the Critique of Judgment,<br />

on the other hand, we are dealing with regulative principles for the<br />

faculty of judgment not for the understanding, and these principles<br />

are to be applied to a particular object — possibly at the same time.<br />

With regard to the concept of natural purpose, we are not dealing<br />

with two merely heuristic maxims expressing two different cognitive<br />

interests, such as for instance: dissect the anatomical structure,<br />

consider the ecological context. With regard to a natural purpose,<br />

both conflicting maxims are, according to Kant, necessary to<br />

acquire knowledge about the object at all. Thus it must be explained<br />

in what sense the two (heuristic) maxims are said to be necessary.<br />

If the first maxim (R1) were only supposed to assert that<br />

everything should be considered as causally determined, there<br />

would be no difficulty in showing its necessity. Only that which is<br />

causally determined can be an object of experience at all. It would be<br />

a necessary maxim but not one of reflective judgment; it would be a<br />

constitutive principle of determinate judgment. As a regulative<br />

principle its purported necessity must receive a special explanation.<br />

If mechanism is not identical to causality, then the supposed necessity<br />

of the maxim of mechanism needs special justification.<br />

The same explanation of the necessity of mechanism is given<br />

a number of times in the course of the Dialectic. In §70 after the<br />

formal presentation of the antinomy, Kant writes:

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