01.05.2013 Views

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Resolution 161<br />

of reason to their transcendental presuppositions. Consider the two<br />

constitutive principles:<br />

[C1] Thesis: All production of material things is possible in terms of<br />

merely mechanical laws.<br />

[C2] Antithesis: Some production of material things is not possible in<br />

terms of merely mechanical laws. (B314-5; CJ, 267)<br />

The content of these statements can be understood either constitutively<br />

as dogmatic assertions or merely regulatively as subjective<br />

maxims guiding research. We can use them regulatively (logically)<br />

without taking as a constitutive principle the "transcendental presupposition"<br />

that we thereby make. Just as in the Transcendental<br />

Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critical Philosophy can<br />

save the dogmatic postulates of pre-Kantian philosophy as heuristic<br />

maxims of research. If we interpret the constitutive principles (C1,<br />

C2) as merely regulative in the sense of the Transcendental Dialectic,<br />

then they do in fact express merely different cognitive interests<br />

and do not come into conflict.<br />

However, there is no regulative interpretation of the conflicting<br />

constitutive principles (C1, C2) that can produce the two<br />

maxims R1 and R2 in which the antinomy consists. A regulative<br />

interpretation of the constitutive principles does not make them<br />

necessary, but the antinomy subsists between the general necessity<br />

and the occasional impossibility of merely mechanistic judgment.<br />

Between regulative principles an antinomy can occur only if the<br />

conflicting maxims are in some sense "indispensible." Recall<br />

Kant's original announcement of the antinomy: "Now between these<br />

necessary maxims of reflective judgment a conflict may arise, and<br />

hence an antinomy" (§69, B312; CJ, 266). The antinomy arises not<br />

merely because Kant takes up the dogmatic postulates of his predecessors<br />

as regulative principles, but rather because in the case of<br />

natural purposes (and only there) these regulative principles must<br />

be employed.<br />

3.5 The Resolution of the Antinomy<br />

The resolution of the antinomy of judgment consists in the<br />

appeal to a "peculiarity of our understanding" (as it is expressed in

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!