KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
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Infinite Judgments 71<br />
in this context as "transcendental reflection upon traditional logic";<br />
this is an interpretation that can easily be reconciled with the text as<br />
it stands and fits in very well with Kant's later pronouncements. 28<br />
From this perspective, we can distinguish two logical levels<br />
besides the transcendental: a logic of judgments and a logic of terms<br />
or predicates. The logical form of the judgment is independent of the<br />
positive or negative form of the predicate; "general" logic — as far<br />
as quality is concerned — asks only whether the copula is "est" or<br />
"non est". But in a transcendental reflection upon logic we consider<br />
the "functions" or actions of the understanding in judging; there it<br />
could make a difference, if we posit a negation instead of removing<br />
an affirmation. The fact that an affirmative (infinite) judgment<br />
such as "anima est non-mortalis" can be logically opposed to<br />
another affirmative judgment such as "anima est mortalis"<br />
depends, according to Kant's analysis, on the content of the two<br />
judgments; but the opposition of the content of the two judgments<br />
itself depends merely on the form of the predicates, i.e. on the fact<br />
that one is the negation of the other. The two judgments differ only<br />
in the logical particle 'non' which in one judgment is attached to the<br />
predicate. Kant believes that the 'non' in "non-mortal" exercises a<br />
formal function and is not just part of the material term. If I say,<br />
"The soul is mortal; the soul is everlasting," the two judgments are<br />
inconsistent due to their content, due to the meanings of the predicates.<br />
But since the differences in meaning of the predicates is not<br />
based on a merely formal difference in the predicate terms (such as<br />
mortal/non-mortal), their opposition is not purely formal, i.e.<br />
properly logical.<br />
The passage from the Transcendental Analytic quoted above<br />
thus proves to be somewhat ambiguous. Kant asserts that "general<br />
logic abstracts from all content of the predicate"; he does not claim<br />
that logic abstracts completely from the form of the predicate.<br />
Furthermore, the characterization of the predicate in infinite judgements<br />
as "merely negative" can only mean that it is supposed to be<br />
negative in a formal (and thus logical) sense. Kant cannot be interpreted<br />
as meaning "negative" in some transcendental sense, for in<br />
terms of transcendental content "non-mortal" or "immortal" (the<br />
28 Krüger, "Wollte Kant...?" p. 348. Cf. Refl. 3071 (Ak 16,640) and Kant's<br />
lectures in Ak 24,2,577 and 929.