KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

84 The Unconditioned and the Infinite Series
architectonic interest of reason" in quantities of manageable size
(B503), which of course recommends the finitism of the thesis position.
It should be remarked here that the characterization of
Newtonian empiricism (called "Platonism") as moral and popular
but speculatively second rate is a sort of obituary for the thesis position,
since the antinomy deals with a conflict in speculative metaphysics
not with a moral conflict or a popularity contest.
Kant then points out that the infinite series of the antithesis of
each antinomy are too large for our understanding, but he also
admits that the finite series of the theses are too small (B514-16). 38
After offering transcendental idealism with its distinction between
appearance and thing in itself as the "key to the solution of the cosmological
dialectic," he turns to the "critical solution of the cosmological
conflict of reason with itself" (B525). This section contains,
besides the analysis of the logical structure of the antinomies discussed
above (the digression on Zeno), the most explicit presentation
of the premises of the arguments of the antinomies. Kant explains:
Further, if the conditioned as well as its condition are things in themselves,
then upon the former being given, the regress to the latter is not only set as
a task, but the condition therewith already really given. And since this holds
of all the members of the series, the complete series of the conditions, and
therefore the unconditioned, is given therewith, or rather is presupposed in
view of the fact that the conditioned, which is only possible through the
complete series, is given. (B*526)
If we were dealing with a thing in itself, then it could be that with
the conditioned all the conditions of its possibility could also be
given. If the world were a thing in itself, then the series of its conditions
would be given with it and would have a definite magnitude
(either finite or infinite); it would not merely be indeterminately
given as a task of synthesis of a series.
Before Kant turns to the resolution of the cosmological antinomies
in particular, he undertakes in the eighth section an analysis
of the concept of infinite series. This analysis must be examined
38 In the case of the Fourth Antinomy Kant substitues thesis for antithesis; I think
this is due merely to carelessness. It should, however, be noted that there are a
number of other peculiarities in connection with the Fourth Antinomy, which, for
instance, is twice called an "apparent antinomy" (B588, B592), an antinomy itself
being only an apparent contradiction. Here, too, I would suggest careless formulation
and not intent to distinguish the Fourth Antinomy as a sort of pseudoantinomy.
An interpretation which allowed us to take Kant literally would of
course be preferable, if it could be provided. Wike (Kant's Antinomies pp. 53f and
91f) makes an attempt.