KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
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Introduction 3<br />
comprehending an organic whole as an additive system of independent<br />
parts (pp. 409f). In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment"<br />
Kant offers a solution that traces both problems back to the same<br />
structural peculiarity of mechanistic explanation. Kant is concerned<br />
not with the question of whether mechanism or vitalism<br />
(which arose in his lifetime) is right in biology but rather with the<br />
question of whether reductionism (which he considers to be the only<br />
scientific method) when applied to the organism displays a structural<br />
flaw that again and again necessitates teleological additions.<br />
He sees in the conflict between mechanism and anti-mechanism the<br />
same kind of antithetical opposition that he had analyzed in the<br />
'Antinomies' chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason, in which each<br />
side looks strong only as long as it is attacking the other.<br />
*****<br />
Any new interpretation of Kant's philosophy inevitably takes<br />
up a position vis à vis the manifold approaches and traditions of<br />
interpretation. The discussion of these various approaches and the<br />
justification of my own approach do not belong in the introduction,<br />
but I would like at the start at least to indicate which traditions I<br />
have found helpful. As for my own approach, it can only be justified<br />
in practice: by providing an interpretation of the text that is historically<br />
and philologically sound and philosophically convincing. My<br />
claim at least is to have provided such an interpretation of the<br />
"Critique of Teleological Judgment" for the first time.<br />
In view of the announced intention to read Kant's critique of<br />
teleology as philosophy of biology, it will come as no surprise that the<br />
tradition of Kant interpretation to which I am closest is one that sees<br />
Kant primarily as the philosopher of modern science. This kind of<br />
interpretation is most closely associated with the German Neo-<br />
Kantians, in particular, Erich Adickes and Ernst Cassirer; and this<br />
is the interpretation that I consider to be right enough to be worth<br />
criticizing in detail.<br />
This book represents an attempt to learn something from<br />
Kant about the structure of biological explanation. The "Critique of<br />
Teleological Judgment," which is the second part of the Critique of<br />
Judgment and could perhaps best be seen as a fourth 'Critique', is