KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF TELEOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
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126 Summary<br />
position proves to be not an analytical opposition (contradiction) but<br />
rather a merely dialectical or synthetic opposition (contrary opposition).<br />
Both propositions could be false. Since all proofs for the various<br />
propositions were apagogical, they are thus all invalid; nonetheless<br />
the refutations of the respective counter-propositions,<br />
contained in the proofs, are still valid.<br />
2. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant reiterates an assumption<br />
that he had introduced as early as the Monadologia physica, namely<br />
that the parts condition the whole, but the whole does not condition<br />
the parts. This assumption leads, if one takes Kant's concepts and<br />
arguments seriously, to an incompatibility between the justifications<br />
of the First and Second Antinomies: either the dissection of a<br />
material system (Second Antinomy) is a regress from a conditioned<br />
to its condition or the composition of a material system in space<br />
(First Antinomy) is such a regress. Only one of them can be a<br />
regress, and without a regress there is no antinomy. The equation of<br />
the relation of part and whole with that of cause and effect is not<br />
problematized at all by Kant. The identity of the two relations seems<br />
to be self-evident.<br />
3. The system of antinomies of reason that Kant presents at the<br />
end of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" is complete and closed<br />
in its structure. There is no place for additional antinomies of reason.<br />
The antinomy of judgment, which is not foreseen there, must<br />
have a different position in the critical system than the antinomies<br />
of reason.